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I. Introduction
World War III is an event the world universally wishes to
avoid. Threats of preemptive strikes, retaliations, and nuclear
weapons development bring speculation to the foreground about
whether tensions today between Israel and Iran might result in an
escalation of hostilities leading to a third World War.4 Iran has
long professed hatred for the Jewish state, and, according to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), may be developing
nuclear weapons.' Israeli leaders say that if necessary, they will
preemptively strike Iran to prevent it from developing nuclear
attack capability.'
3 As Albert Einstein famously opined, "I know not with what weapons World
War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones."
Antonia Handler Chayes, "Security in an Age ofAnxiety ": What Can Verification Offer?,
30 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., no. 3, 2006, at 97.
4 See World War III: Israel Attacks Iran, Russia and China Will Retaliate, THE
CANADIAN (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.agoracosmopolitan.com/news/intrnational/
2011/11/08/1598.html.
5 See Louis Rend Beres, Israel, Iran, and Nuclear War: A Jurisprudential
Assessment, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 65, 66 (1996).
6 Int'l Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement
and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
50, GOV/2012/9 (Feb. 24, 2012) [hereinafter February IAEA Report], available at
www.iaea.org/publications/documents/board/2012/gov2012-9.pdf.
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While a strike might forestall a nuclear Iran, at least for the
time being, the international community may not view this
preemptive measure as legal or legitimate. Using force in self-
defense must be subject to clear boundaries in order to prevent
rampant violence. While war is never desired, "a legal war is
more human than an illegal war."' But the rules of using force
must be generally known and accepted in order to be effective.'
This comment attempts to clarify the field of international law
regarding use of force in anticipatory self-defense, and
recommends that clear standards be widely established to better
guide both nations considering such use of force and the
international community, which must respond to this use of force.
This comment assesses the legality of a potential Israeli
preemptive strike against Iran's nuclear program. There is no
recognized and accepted analytical framework to assess this
legality."o Therefore, this comment employs two methods of
analysis and considers them both: first, it will employ the time-
tested analytical methodology of analogy by comparing the state
of the current Israeli-Iran conflict to incidents of anticipatory self-
defense. Second, it will apply an analytical framework, proposed
by David A. Sadoff, that offers a clear, practicable standard to
govern evaluation of anticipatory use of force." Part I discusses
8 Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical
History of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49, 50 (1994).
9 See U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility
Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, 184, U.N. Doc.
A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter High-level Panel Report], available at
http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf ("The maintenance of world peace and
security depends importantly on there being a common global understanding, and
acceptance, of when the application of force is both legal and legitimate.").
10 While various frameworks have been proposed, no single framework has been
adopted or widely applied. See, e.g., David A. Sadoff, Striking a Sensible Balance on
the Legality of Defensive First Strikes, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 441, 442 (2009)
[hereinafter Sadoff, Striking] (proposing a framework that expands the doctrine of
"proactive defense" by emphasizing the necessity of (1) properly gauging a threat, (2)
exhausting peaceful alternatives, and (3) taking responsive actions). Sadoff's framework
is discussed at length below. See infra Part IB. 1.
11 Sadoff served as Deputy Legal Advisor to the National Security Council and as
Assistant General Counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency before seeking his
doctorate in Public International Law at the Universit6 de Genave in Switzerland. See
Sadoff, Striking, supra note 10, at 441.
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the backdrop of international law regarding the use of force in
self-defense. Part II defines the terms used and discusses both the
traditional and proposed analytical frameworks used to assess the
legality of anticipatory acts of self-defense. Part III describes and
analyzes generally recognized incidents of anticipatory self-
defense. Part IV assesses the current situation between Israel and
Iran using analogies to past incidents and Sadoff's proposed
analytical framework. Part V concludes that while the traditional
framework under customary international law would condemn an
Israeli strike, a clearer standard encompassing legitimacy as well
as legality would better guide the international community in
evaluating anticipatory uses of force in the modern era.
II. International Law and the Use of Force in Self-Defense
Self-defense has been described as "[n]ature's eldest law."l2
Today, this right to self-defense has been codified in Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter.' 3 In order to analyze the legality of an Israeli
preemptive strike on Iran's nuclear program, it is first necessary to
understand the state of intemational law concerning the use of
force in preemptive or anticipatory self-defense.
A. The Road to Modern International Law and the Use of
Force
Before aspiring to describe the modern intricacies of
international law, it is helpful to first understand the origins of
international law and regulation of the use of force between
nations. Person to person, community to community, and state to
state, the use of force is a salient aspect of humankind's history.14
As one scholar puts it, "force has been a consistent feature of the
global system since the beginning of time."" War has been so
prevalent in human history that it has been considered a "perennial
12 Gregory A. Raymond & Charles W. Kegley, Jr., Preemption and Preventive
War, in THE LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE: THE JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE
CUSTOMARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 99, 100 (Howard M. Hensel, ed., 2008) (citing
John Dryden, Absalom and A chitopel, supra note 1, at 144).
13 See infra Part I.B.2.
14 ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE
OF FORCE: BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM 2 (1993).
15 Id. at 2-3.
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fact of life ... tantamount to . .. plague or flood or fire."' 6  It
would "appear every once in a while, leave death and devastation
in its wake, and temporarily pass away to return at a later date.""
Over time, the need to restrict and regulate wars between
nations developed, and war assumed a "legal status."'" The
attempt to restrict is first characterized by the "just war-unjust
war" dichotomy of Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome,19 which
classical jurists and scholars of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries advanced with their writings.2 0 By the nineteenth
century, however, this dichotomy was abandoned.2 1 The accepted
view of this period was that international law had nothing to do
with attempting to distinguish just and unjust wars.2 2 War was
viewed as "a right inherent in sovereignty itself."23 Through the
nineteenth century, there was a widespread acceptance of a
sovereign nation's right to go to war.24
Perhaps in reaction to this widespread acceptance, bilateral
treaties between nations began to arise at the end of the nineteenth
25century. These treaties were formed to create contractual
obligations between states to not go to war with each other.26
Bilateral treaties eventually led to the creation of multilateral
16 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 69 (3rd ed. 2001)
(citing C. EAGLETON, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT 455 (3rd ed. 1957)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
17 Id at 69.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 59-60.
20 Id. at 61.
21 Id. at 63.
22 DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 63. "Distinctions between just and unjust causes of
war 'belong to morality and theology, and are as much out of place in a treatise on
International Law as would be a discussion on the ethics of marriage in a book on the
law of personal status."' Id. (quoting T.J. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 311 (P.H. Winfield ed., 7th ed. 1923)).
23 Id. at 71 (citing A.S. HERSHEY, THE ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW
349 (1912)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
24 Id
25 Id
26 Id. at 73. One example includes the 1878 treaty between Honduras and
Nicaragua, in which the two nations agreed that "there shall in no case be war" between
them. Id. (citing Tegulcigalpa Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Extradition, Hond.-
Nicar., art. II, 1878, 152 C.T.S. 415, 416).
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treaties in an effort to "curtail somewhat the freedom of war in
general international law."27 After a few multilateral attempts to
restrict inter-state use of force,28 war finally became "illegal in
principle" in 1928 with the General Treaty for Renunciation of
War as an Instrument of National Policy (otherwise known as the
Kellogg-Briand Pact). 29  Though flawed, the Kellogg-Briand Pact
was a "watershed date in the history of the legal regulation of the
use of inter-state force."3 0
These early developments in establishing the illegality of war
led to the Charter of the United Nations, signed in 1945 in San
Francisco." In response to the Second World War, the United
Nations was created "to establish a universal international
organization charged with the management of international
conflict."3 2  Delegates of forty-nine states were determined "to
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."3 3 To this
end, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter proscribes both the use and
threat of force.34 Two major exceptions exist, however, to this
general prohibition against use of force.35 Nations may use force
27 Id. at 74.
28 The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the Covenant of the League of
Nations of 1919 took steps to contractually limit signatories' freedom to jump into war
without taking alternative steps. See DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 74-77.
29 Id. at 77-78.
30 Id. at 78, 80. The flaws of the Kellogg-Briand Pact were described to include
"(i) the issue of self-defence was not clearly addressed in the text; (ii) no agreed upon
limits were set on the legality of war as an instrument of international policy; (iii) the
prohibition of war did not embrace the entire international community; and (iv) forcible
measures short of war were eliminated from consideration." Id at 80. While the
Kellogg-Briand Pact "contained no express reservation of the right of national self-
defense ... the right of national defense [was regarded] as so firmly established in
international law that no express reservation was required." Michael Franklin Lohr,
Legal Analysis of US. Military Responses to State-Sponsored International Terrorism,
34 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 17 (1985).
31 See DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 80.
32 AREND & BECK, supra note 14, at 29.
33 Id. (quoting U.N. Charter, pmbl.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
34 U.N. Charter art. 2, 1 4. ("All Members [of the United Nations] shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.").
35 AREND & BECK, supra note 14, at 31-32. In addition to the two major
exceptions, Article 106 allows the five permanent nation states of the Security Council to
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if they are acting either in individual or collective self-defense or
if force has been authorized by the U.N. Security Council.36
B. Self-Defense
Even before the creation of the U.N. Charter, self-defense has
been historically recognized as an inherent right of both
individuals and sovereign nations.37 As one scholar notes, self-
defense "has long been founded on the simple notion that every
rational being ... must conclude that it is permissible to defend
himself when his life is threatened with immediate danger." 8 In
addition to an individual's right to self-defense, the right of
nations to use force in self-defense has also traditionally been
recognized.3 ' The right of a nation to defend its sovereignty is
"embedded" in the "fundamental right of [s]tates to survival."'o
This being the case, there is no dispute over the legality of a state
defending itself against attacks on its sovereignty.4 1 What remains
unsettled in modem legal scholarship, however, is when a nation
"take joint military action" during the period before the establishment of a formal
Security Council procedure to authorize uses of force. Id As this formal procedure has
since been developed, the Article 106 exception is, for all intents and purposes, "dead."
Id. at 32. Additionally, Articles 107 and 53 authorize the use of force against "enemy"
states of the Second World War. Id. at 32-33. In the modem age, these two exceptions
are not significant. Id. at 33.
36 See U.N. Charter art. 51; infra Part I.B.2.
37 See Niaz A. Shah, Self-Defence, Anchipatory Self-Defence and Pre-emption:
International Law's Response to Terrorism, 12 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 95 (2007).
"It is admitted that a just right of self-defence attaches always to nations as well as to
individuals, and is equally necessary for the preservation of both." Id. (quoting Daniel
Webster, Letters from US. Secretary of State Daniel Webster to British Minister Mr.
Fox, in 29 BRIT. & FOREIGN AFF. PAPERS 1129, 1137-398 (1840-1841)).
38 John J. Merriam, Natural Law and Self-Defense, 206 MIL. L. REv. 43, 46
(2010).
39 Raymond & Kegley, supra note 12, at 100. "Envisioned by the ancients as a
natural right of individuals, [self-defense] has also been recognized by international legal
authorities as a right of sovereign territorial states since the Peace of Westphalia (1648)
gave rise to modem world system [sic]." Id.
40 DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 159. Another scholar articulated the purpose of self-
defense as "[protecting] certain essential legal rights; its aim is preventative and non-
retributive, and ... it is this characteristic which distinguishes self-defence from
reprisals." D. W. BowETr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (1958).
41 See DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 159.
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may invoke this right.42 Traditionally, self-defense may only be
used when necessary to repel an "overt armed attack," and is
impermissible as a form of retaliation. 43 The notion behind self-
defense in anticipation of an armed attack, however, is that
"[s]tates faced with a perceived immediate attack cannot be
expected to await the attack like 'sitting ducks' but should be
allowed to take the appropriate measures for their defense." 4 4
1. Customary International Law
Under customary international law, nations may use force in
anticipatory self-defense in order to "thwart discernible impending
attacks."4 5 The established doctrine arises from an incident known
as the "Caroline incident."4 6 In 1837, the United States and Great
Britain were at peace and Canada was under British colonial rule.47
However, factions of Canadians were engaged in an "armed
insurrection" against the British.4 8  The Caroline, a privately-
owned American steamship owned and operated by Americans,
was used to transport men and supplies across the Niagara River to
support the Canadian rebels.49 On the night of December 29,
1837, British soldiers seized the Caroline while it was docked on
the American side of the river, dragged the boat into the current,
set it afire, and let it loose to drift over the Niagara Falls.so Two
Americans were killed in the incident.)'
In response, a series of letters were exchanged between Henry
42 Raymond & Kegley, supra note 12, at 100.
43 Id.
44 STANIMOR A. ALEXANDROV, SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 149 (1996) (citations omitted).
45 Raymond & Kegley, supra note 12, at 100.
46 This incident, widely cited as the origin of the necessary and proportionate
requirements for use of force under customary international law, is said to have "attained
a mythical authority." See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE 149 (2008).
47 David A. Sadoff, A Question ofDeterminacy: The Legal Status ofAnticipatory
Self-Defense, 40 GEO. J. INT'L L. 523, 535-36 (2009) [hereinafter Sadoff, A Question].
48 Id.; see also AREND & BECK, supra note 14, at 18.
49 See Martin A. Rogoff & Edward Collins, Jr., The Caroline Incident and the
Development ofInternational Law, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 493, 495 (1990).
50 See id; see also AREND & BECK, supra note 14, at 18.
51 Rogoff& Collins, supra note 49, at 495.
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Fox, the British Minister in Washington, and the U.S. Secretary of
State.5 2 The British claimed that the destruction of the Caroline
was justified as "necessity of self-defense and self-preservation."53
The response of Secretary of State Daniel Webster has become
immortalized as the factors necessary to justify an act of self-
defense.5 4 Webster stated that the act would not be justifiable
unless the British could show:
necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means, and no moment of deliberation. It will be for it
to [show], also, that the local authorities of Canada, even
supposing the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter
the territories of the United States at all, did nothing
unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the
necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and
kept clearly within it.5
This response has become known as the Caroline doctrine, and
asserts that for a use of force in anticipatory self-defense to be
justified, it must be necessary, proportionate, and in response to an
imminent threat of armed attack where no other means of redress
are available. These factors have become generally accepted and
incorporated into customary international law.57
52 While initially the United States Secretary of State engaged in the matter was
John Forsyth, he was replaced by Daniel Webster in early 1841. Id. at 495-96.
53 Id. at 496.
54 Id. at 496-97.
55 Id. at 497-98 (citing BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS: REPORTS AND
PAPERS FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE CONFIDENTIAL PRINT, PART 1, SERIES C, NORTH
AMERICA, 1837-1941, VOL. 1, (K. Bourne, ed., McLeod and Maine 1986)).
56 See id. at 498.
57 AREND & BECK, supra note 14, at 18. The Caroline doctrine was invoked on a
number of occasions following the Caroline incident. See Sadoff, A Question, supra
note 47, at 538-39. It was "preserved with reservations" in the 1928 Kellogg-Briand
Pact, asserted as Japan's defense in 1931 for their invasion of Manchuria, and applied
verbatim in the 1946 Nuremberg trials in the matter of Germany's 1940 invasion of
Norway. Id (internal citations omitted). But see James A. Green, Docking the
Caroline: Understanding the Relevance of the Formula in Contemporary Customary
International Law Concerning Self-Defense, 14 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 429
(2006) (contending that the Caroline formula for justifying anticipatory self-defense is
not representative of contemporary customary international law).
2752012]
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2. The U.N. Charter and Article 51
The Charter of the United Nations was adopted in 1945." As
discussed above, Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the use of
force between nations, except in the case of two major exceptions.
First, Article 51 articulates a nation's right to use force in self-
defense." Second, Chapter VII of the Charter allows the use of
force "as may be necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security" under authorization of the U.N. Security
Council.6 0 This analysis focuses on Article 51, as it is "the focal
point" in discussing the permissibility of self-defense.6
Under Article 51 of the Charter, a nation has the right to use
force in individual or collective self-defense.62 The Article
provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise
of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in
58 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice,
June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, TS No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153.
59 U.N. Charter art. 51.
60 U.N. Charter art. 42.
61 Sadoff, A Question, supra note 47, at 540-41. Chapter VII (Article 42) uses of
force are also tangentially relevant to a discussion of anticipatory self-defense. Article
39 of the Charter, which operates as the gateway to permit Article 42 actions, provides
that "[t]he Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression." U.N. Charter art. 39 (emphasis added). In
fact, scholars observe that the reference to "'the threat to the peace' . . . demonstrates that
pre-emptive action was always intended to be a major feature [of the Charter]."
Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force:
Afghanistan, AI-Qaida, and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 7, 19 (2003).
62 See DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 161. Individual self-defense refers to the right
of an individual state to use force in self-defense when it is the victim of an armed attack.
See Eustace Chikere Azubuike, Probing the Scope of Self Defense in International Law,
17 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 129, 155 (2011). Collective self-defense refers to the
right of a state to respond with force when another state is the victim of an armed attack.
Collective self-defense preserves the right of nations bound by treaty to respond if a
fellow treaty-state is attacked. See id. at 173-74; infra note 110.
276 [Vol. XXXVIII
ISRAEL AND IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
63
order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
While "the right of self-defence pursuant to the U.N. Charter
has its origins in customary international law," Article 51 appears
to limit uses of force in self-defense only to situations where an
"armed attack" has occurred." As Professor Dinstein succinctly
observes, this limitation presents a "material difference in the
range of operation of the right [of self-defense] between these two
sources [of international law]." 65 Many scholars have very
divergent views on the implications of this difference.
3. The Debate
The debate surrounding the legality of anticipatory defense in
modern international law is extensive and seemingly unlimited.
Scholars can generally be divided into two camps: restrictionist
and expansionist.6 6 First, however, it is necessary to clarify the
terminology used in the debate on self-defense.67
While a plethora of scholars seem to offer as many definitions
and distinctions as there are authors,68 this article will use the
terminology as categorized by David Sadoff.6 9 First, there are two
general types of self-defense: reactive and non-reactive."
Reactive strikes occur "when a State responds to an attack after it
63 U.N. Charter art. 51.
64 DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 165.
6 5 Jd
66 These camps have also been categorized as "broad" and "narrow"
interpretations of the right of self-defense. See, e.g., Natalino Ronzitti, The Expanding
Law of Self-Defence, 11 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 343, 344-45 (2006).
67 For a further discussion of the importance of clarifying the semantics of these
terms, see Dominika varc, Redefining Imminence: The Use of Force Against Threats
and Armed Attacks in the Twenty-First Century, 13 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 171, 173
(2006).
68 See, e.g., Raymond & Kegley, supra note 12, at 101 (distinguishing preemptive
attacks and preventive attacks); Greenwood, supra note 61, at 15 (distinguishing the
doctrine of "pre-emption" from anticipatory self-defense as referring "to a broader right
of self-defense"); AREND & BECK, supra note 14 (using anticipatory self-defense and
"preemptive" self-defense interchangeably); Thomas R. Anderson, Legitimizing the New
Imminence: Bridging the Gap Between the Just War and the Bush Doctrine, 8 GEO. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 261, 263-67 (2010) (distinguishing preemptive war, preventive war,
anticipatory self-defense, prophylactic self-defense, and "The Bush Doctrine").
69 See Sadoff, A Question, supra note 47, at 529-32.
70 Id
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has occurred." 71 Non-reactive strikes, otherwise referred to as
"defensive first strikes," occur "when a State takes military action
before being hit."72  Defensive first strikes can be further sub-
divided into three categories: interceptive, anticipatory, and
preemptive." These three categories can be viewed as the rough
points on a spectrum of "real or perceived timing of the threat
posed by an aggressor State." 74 Interceptive self-defense
encompasses the most immediate threats, while preemptive
encompasses the least immediate.
Interceptive self-defense, as first articulated by Professor
Dinstein, "takes place after the other side has committed itself to
an armed attack in an ostensibly irrevocable way."76 This refers to
scenarios with the shortest amount of time between the self-
defensive act and the perceived threat.77  As Sir Humphrey
Waldock describes, "[w]here there is convincing evidence not
merely of threats and potential danger but of an attack being
actually mounted, then an armed attack may be said to have begun
to occur, though it has not passed the frontier. "7' Dinstein asserts
that not only is interceptive self-defense legitimate under
customary international law, it is also legitimate under Article
5 1.79
Anticipatory self-defense, by contrast, is "the use of force in
71 Id at 529.
72 Id.
73 Id at 530.
74 Id.
75 Sadoff, A Question, supra note 47, at 530.
76 DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 172. It has been suggested that the term
"interceptive self-defense" may be more "consonant with reactive self-defense," given
the nature of the attack facing the nation. See Sadoff, Striking, supra note 10, at 445 n.8
(citing Guy B. Roberts, Self-Help in Combating State-Sponsored Terrorism: Self Defense
and Peacetime Reprisals, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 243, 275 (1987)).
77 See Sadoff, A Question, supra note 47, at 530-3 1.
78 C.H.M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in
International Law, in 2 ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COURS 451,
498 (1952), quoted in DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 172.
79 See DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 172. One scholar notes, however, that
interceptive defense "has only the slimmest instance margin of practical applicability."
Sadoff, Striking, supra note 10, at 445 n.8. More notable is the scholar's observation
that "there is virtually no historical instance in which such defensive force has ever been
exercised." Id.
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'anticipation' of an attack when a State has manifested its
capability and intent to attack imminently."80 The Caroline
doctrine is generally considered to reflect assertions of
anticipatory self-defense. 8' This refers to scenarios where an
attack may be imminent but not yet underway.8 2 The temporal
definition of what constitutes "imminence" is not well-established
or even well-articulated." Many scholars assert that Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter recognizes anticipatory self-defense through its
preservation of states' "inherent right of .. . self-defense."84
Preemptive self-defense, which is used in this comment to
encompass the concept of "preventive" self-defense, refers to the
use of force "to quell any possibility of future attack by another
state, even where there is no reason to believe that an attack is
planned and where no prior attack has occurred."86 This scenario
refers to defensive first strikes that are temporally the most
removed from the perceived threat." While the majority of
80 Sadoff, A Question, supra note 47, at 530.
81 THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS
AND ARMED ATTACKS 97 (2002).
82 See Shah, supra note 37, at 112 ("Anticipatory self-defence ... would authorise
armed responses to attacks that are on the brink of being launched.") (emphasis added);
see also Raymond & Kegley, supra note 12, at 101 ("[M]ilitary force is used to quell or
mitigate an impending strike by an adversary.") (emphasis added).
83 See Michael N. Schmitt, US. Security Strategies: A Legal Assessment, 27
HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 737, 755 (2004) (contrasting the traditional interpretation of
immediacy as when "the pending, armed attack is about to be attacked" with interpreting
immediacy "in light of its underlying purposes, permitting States to defend themselves
effectively against attack while allowing the greatest opportunity possible for means
short of the use of force to resolve the situation").
84 U.N. Charter art. 51. See Shah, supra note 37, at 99-101; see also Waldock,
supra note 78, at 498 ("If an armed attack is imminent within the strict doctrine of the
Caroline, then it would seem to bring the case within Article 51.").
85 The term "preventive strike" is used to reflect strikes that occur when the threat
is very removed in time, synonymous to our use of the term "preemptive" here.
Specifically, preventive self-defense has been defined as "attacks ... in which military
force is used to eliminate any possible future strike, even when there is no reason to
believe that aggression is planned or the capability to launch such a strike is
operational." Raymond & Kegley, supra note 12, at 101-02. See also DINSTEIN, supra
note 16, at 168 (referring to "preventive war").
86 Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense, THE AM. SOC'Y
OF INT'L L. TASKFORCE ON TERRORISM 2 n.10 (Aug. 2002),
http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf.
87 See id (distinguishing preemptive self-defense from anticipatory self-defense
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scholars reject the legality of preemptive self-defense under
international law," it has been argued that use of preemptive force
may still be legitimate.89
The restrictionist and expansivist schools of interpreting the
legality of self-defense focus their debate on the "middle-ground"
of defensive first-strikes, that of anticipatory self-defense.
Professor Ronzitti aligns the two camps in terms of a geographical
divergence.90  The restrictionist camp is referred to as the
"continental doctrine," while the expansivist doctrine is attributed
to common law countries and Israel.9 1 The question that divides
the two camps is "whether the words 'if an armed attack occurs'
introduce[s] . . . a rigid test of legitimate self-defense."9 2
The restrictionist camp asserts that "self-defense [can] lawfully
be exercised only if the State is the object of an actual attack."9 3
Under this view, "use of force under the Charter is expressly
limited to situations where an armed attack has already
commenced or occurred." 94 The restrictionist camp recognizes the
right to use force in anticipatory self-defense under customary
international law, but asserts that the adoption of the Charter in
1945 limited "the scope of that right."9 5  As Professor Dinstein
emphasizes, "[tlhe use of the phrase 'armed attack' in Article 51 is
which authorizes "armed response to attacks that are on the brink of launch") (emphasis
added).
88 See Shah, supra note 37, at 115.
89 See Abraham D. Sofaer, The Best Defense? Preventive Force and International
Security, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 109, 116 (2010) [hereinafter Soafer, Preventive Force]
(recognizing that "the legitimacy of an action can differ from its legality"); see also
supra notes 122-127 and accompanying text. But see varc, supra note 67, at 187
("[Preventive war] is an offensive strategic response to a long-term threat, not a
defensive tactical response to an impending attack, which is the underlying rational of
the anticipatory action.").
90 Ronzitti, supra note 66, at 344-45.
91 Id. See also Greenwood, supra note 61, at 12 (mentioning that both the United
States and the United Kingdom maintain that "the right of self-defense also applies when
an armed attack has not yet taken place but is imminent").
92 Waldock, supra note 78, at 497 (emphasis added) (quoting U.N. Charter art.
51).
93 Ronzitti, supra note 66, at 345.
94 Shah, supra note 37, at 97.
95 Id
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not inadvertent . . . [it] is deliberately restrictive."96 Dinstein
concludes that "self-defence consistent with Article 51 implies
resort to counter-force ... in reaction to the use of force by the
other party.""
By contrast, the expansivist camp asserts that "the right of self-
defence can be exercised not only when the State has been the
object of an armed attack but also when the attack is imminent."
Three reasons have been cited to support this theory. First,
expansivists cite that the actual reading of "if an armed attack
occurs" does not necessarily mean "after an armed attack has
occurred."99 Professor Waldock elaborates that this "goes beyond
the necessary meaning of the words," and cites the French text:
"dans un cas oii un Membre des Nations Unies est I'objet d'une
agression armde."" Second, expansivists note that the Article
51's preservation of the "inherent right" of self-defense was "a
comparatively late addition to the Charter, for most States initially
assumed that 'the right of self-defense was inherent in the
proposals and did not need explicit mention in the Charter."'
101
Lastly, and most persuasively, the expansivist camp notes that
Article 51 preserves the "inherent right" of self-defense.102 D. W.
Bowettt remarks that "[tihe reference to an 'inherent' right
suggests something of the philosophy of natural law."' 03 Professor
Dinstein himself points out that "the right of self-defence pursuant
to the U.N. Charter has its origins in customary international
law."l0 4  As customary international law permits an act of
96 DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 166.
97 Id. at 167.
98 Ronzitti, supra note 66, at 344.
99 See Waldock, supra note 78, at 497 (citing SIR ERIC BECKETr, THE NORTH
ATLANTICTREATY 13 (1950).
100 Id. In the English version of the U.N. Charter, this text reads "if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations." U.N. Charter, art. 51. See also
supra note 63 and accompanying text. Literally translated, however, the French version
may read "in a case where a member of the United Nations is the object of an armed
aggression" (translated by the author).
101 See Greenwood, supra note 61, at 12 (quoting United Kingdom Commentary on
the United Nations Charter, Cmd. 6666, at 9).
102 Id. (emphasis added).
103 BOwETT,supra note 40, at 187.
104 DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 165. Though this observation can support the
expansivist argument, Dinstein himself appears to subscribe to the restrictionist camp.
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anticipatory self-defence "when the threat of an armed attack is
'imminent',"os it is therefore "not implausible to interpret article
51 as leaving unimpaired the right of self-defense as it existed
prior to the Charter." 0 6  As Professor Shah articulates, "[t]he
intention of article 51 seems to be to make anticipatory self-
defence a statutory right, not to limit it,"' 7 strongly evidenced by
"[t]he inclusion of the word 'inherent' and the absence of any
objection to it by states."'
With such a dispute over the ambiguity of Article 51, many
scholars would turn to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for a
judicial ruling on whether anticipatory self-defense is legal under
Article 51.109 Yet the ICJ has not ruled on the matter. In
Nicaragua v. United States,"o while the ICJ "based its decision on
the norms of customary international law concerning self-defence
as a sequel to an armed attack," the Court explicitly refrained from
pronouncing a judgment on the legality of anticipatory self-
defense. " Without a judicial pronouncement on the matter,
See id. at 167-68 (calling for a reading that "the right of self-defence under Article 51
exists 'if, and only if, an armed attack occurs"' (citing Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 181 (June 27)
(Schwebel, J., dissenting)).
105 Shah, supra note 37, at 99. See also supra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
106 Oscar Schachter, Right of States to Used Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620,
1634 (1983).
107 Shah, supra note 37, at 100.
108 Id
109 See, e.g., Ronzitti, supra note 66, at 345.
110 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter The Nicaragua Case]. In this matter, the ICJ ruled
on whether the use of force by the United States against Nicaragua was justified under
the doctrine of collective self-defense. See GRAY, supra note 46, at 130. Under this
doctrine, a third-party state may use force in defense of another state that has been
attacked, "bas[ing] its participation in collective action on its own right of self-defence."
BoWETr, supra note 40, at 216. Nicaragua brought a case against the United States
before the ICJ to challenge both the United States' use of force against the government
of Nicaragua and for its support of the military and paramilitary activities opposing the
Nicaraguan government. See GRAY, supra note 46, at 75. The court ruled against the
United States, with dissenting opinions from U.S. and British judges. See id at 130.
While the basis of the ICJ's ruling concerned collective self-defense, the court's
discussion of using force in self-defense established that the legality of such acts is based
in customary international law as well as in the U.N. Charter. See ALEXANDROV, supra
note 44, at 135; see also GRAY, supra note 46, at I18-30.
Ill DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 166; see also Shah, supra note 37, at 100; Ronzitti,
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scholars will continue to battle over the legality of anticipatory
self-defense.
4. The State of the Law and Implications
Today, there is no accepted state of international law regarding
the use of force as anticipatory self-defense against an imminent
armed attack.112 However, as numerous scholars have noted, the
world has changed in many significant ways since the drafting of
the U.N. Charter in 1945."' At that time, drafters were primarily
concerned with "overt acts of conventional aggression.""4 Since
1945, however, most conflicts have been in the form of civil
conflicts, covert actions, or acts of terrorism." 5 The "ever-present
threat of the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction" is changing our traditional notions of warfare." 6
While nuclear weapons physically existed at the time the U.N.
Charter was drafted, "the delegates at San Francisco knew nothing
of the nature and effects of nuclear weapons" and thus "could not
have addressed the threat, proliferation, and potential use of these
weapons of mass destruction.""' One delegate specifically
referred to the Charter as a "pre-atomic age charter.""'
Many scholars of the expansivist view point out this seemingly
obvious observation: "[n]o state can be expected to await an initial
attack which, in the present state of armaments, may well destroy
the state's capacity for further resistance and so jeopardize its very
existence."l9 The ICJ itself, in its advisory opinion in the Nuclear
supra note 66, at 345.
112 AREND & BECK, supra note 14, at 73.
113 See id at 37.
114 Id.
115 Id; see also Sofaer, Preventive Force, supra note 89, at 110 (listing the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, piracy, drug and human trafficking, and
genocide as reasons that support the use of preemptive force).
116 AREND & BECK, supra note 14, at 73.
117 Id. at 38-39.
118 Id. at 39 (citing John F. Dulles, Secretary. of State, Address Before the
American Bar Association (Aug. 26, 1953)).
119 BOWETT, supra note 40, at 191-92. See also Greenwood, supra note 61, at 15
("In a nuclear age, common sense cannot require one to interpret an ambiguous provision
in a text in a way that requires a state passively to accept its fate before it can defend
itself.") (quoting ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
How WE USE IT 242 (1994)).
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Weapons Case,2 0 recognizes the "right to resort to self-defence, in
accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, when its survival is at
stake."l21 It seems that there is room for a preemptive use of force
under the U.N. Charter if and only if a state's very survival is at
stake.
Lastly, one could argue against even considering the legality of
using preemptive force.12 2 Abraham Sofaer notes that despite the
"illegality" of using force for "preventive purposes," states have
engaged in such force in over 100 instances since the signing of
the U.N. Charter in 1945.123 He argues that rather than being
concerned over the legality of a preemptive use of force, states
should be concerned over the legitimacy of such an act. 124 Sofaer
advocates adopting a proposal from the 2004 report of the
Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change:125  the U.N. Security Council should "adopt and
systematically address a set of agreed guidelines, going directly
not to whether force can legally be used but whether, as a matter
of good conscience and good sense, it should be." 26 According to
Sofaer, the benefits of "using legitimacy as a guide ... would
allow states to take into account a broader range of considerations
than current international law typically dictates."l 27
120 1996 1.C.J. 226 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion].
121 Id at 96. But see ALEXANDROV, supra note 44, at 23 (quoting JAMES BRIERLY,
THE LAW OF NATIONS 405 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963)) (distinguishing "self-
defense" from "self-preservation" from the observation that "self-preservation in the case
of a state ... is not a legal right but an instinct; and even if it may often happen that the
instinct prevails over the legal duty not to do violence to others, international law ought
not to admit that it is lawful that it should do so.").
122 Sofaer, Preventive Force, supra note 89, at 112-17.
123 Id. at 112.
124 See id at 116. The context of Sofaer's argument is legality according to the
U.N. Charter and the U.N. Security Council. See id at 112. Sofaer goes on to explain
that while many acts of force are both legitimate and legal, or both illegitimate and
illegal, there are inconsistencies. See id at 116-17. He describes the decision of the
U.N. Security Council in the 1990s to deny weapons to victims of ethnic and religious
abuse as "legal but arguably illegitimate," and NATO's intervention and use of force in
Kosovo as "illegal but arguably legitimate." Id.
125 High-level Panel Report, supra note 9; see also infra Part I1.B.2.
126 High-level Panel Report, supra note 9, at T 205; Sofaer, Preventive Force, supra
note 89, at 116.
127 Sofaer, Preventive Force, supra note 89, at 117.
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The state of the law concerning the legality of using force in
preemptive or anticipatory self-defense is convoluted, to say the
least. However, this does not mean that it is impossible to
evaluate the legality of an Israel preemptive attack on the Iranian
nuclear program.
III. The Legality of Anticipatory Self-Defense and Preemptive
Force
Though the state of modem international law is unclear, there
are many arguments to support the legality of using force in
anticipatory self-defense. Under the Caroline doctrine of
customary international law, 2 8 the traditional framework to
evaluate use of force in anticipatory self-defense addresses three
elements: necessity, proportionality, and imminence of a threat
such that no other recourse is available.'29 Alternative frameworks
have also been proposed to expand the customary Caroline
framework.130 Using both the traditional and alternative analytical
frameworks to analyze several modern incidents where the use of
anticipatory self-defense was evidenced or claimed, it is possible
to evaluate the legality of a potential Israeli strike on Iran's
nuclear reactor.
A. Framework under Customary International Law
Regardless of legality under strict interpretation of Article 51
of the U.N. Charter,'"' the Caroline-based elements of necessity,
proportionality, and imminence must be fulfilled for an
anticipatory use of force to be legal under customary international
law. 3 2  While some commentators include imminence in their
analysis of necessity,'33 most commentators include imminence as
128 See supra Part I.B.1.
129 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
130 See supra Part I.B.2.
131 See supra Part I.B.2-3.
132 See Michael N. Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 24 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 513, 529 (2003).
133 See TIMOTHY L. H. MCCORMACK, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
ISRAELI RAID ON THE IRAQI NUCEAR REACTOR 246, 262-76 (1996) (incorporating
imminence into an analysis of the "proximity" of the threat, as a subset of necessity); see
also GRAY, supra note 46, at 148-56.
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a separate element.134
1. Necessity and Proportionality
The principles of necessity and proportionality are "part of the
basic core of self-defence [upon which] all states agree.""' The
requirements of necessity and proportionality in self-defense are
not expressly included in the U.N. Charter, but rather, are tenets of
customary international law that have been reaffirmed by the ICJ
in the Nicaragua case and in the ICJ's Advisory Opinion on the
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.3 6  As Gray
succinctly describes, the "basic, uncontroversial principles" of
necessity and proportionality are that self-defense "must not be
retaliatory or punitive; the aim should be to halt and repel an
attack."' 37 Necessity and proportionality "constitute a minimum
test" that is determinative of the legality of using force in self-
defense.'3 8 Thus, if a nation's use of force is lacking in either
necessity or proportionality, the use of force is not justified under
the doctrine of self-defense, and may in fact be unlawfully
retaliatory or punitive.13 9
134 See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 219 (using the term "immediacy" rather
than "imminence"); Green, supra note 57, at 463-73; Mark L. Rockefeller, The
"Imminent Threat" Requirement for the Use of Preemptive Military Force: Is it Time for
a Non-Temporal Standard?, 33 DENv. J. INT'L L. & Pot'Y 131, 133 (2004); Schmitt,
supra note 132, at 529(2003).
135 GRAY, supra note 46, at 148.
136 See id at 149-50. In the Nicaragua case, the court observed that "[Article 51]
does not contain any specific rule whereby self-defence would warrant only measures
which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well-
established in customary international law." The Nicaragua Case, supra note 110,
176 (emphasis added) (quoted in DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 183). The ICJ's 1996
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons stated that
"[t]he submission of the exercise of the right of self-defence to the conditions of
necessity and proportionality is a rule of customary international law." Nuclear
Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 121, 41 (quoted in DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at
183).
137 GRAY, supra note 46, at 150.
138 Id. at 154.
139 See id at 154-55. Though the actions of the United States in the Nicaragua case
were deemed to be illegal on other grounds, the absence of necessity and proportionality
were additional indicators of the illegality of the acts under customary international law.
See id. at 151.
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Necessity, by itself, is not a controversial proposition. 14 0 States
need to demonstrate that "such forceful action was necessary to
defend itself against an impending attack."'4 1 However, applying
necessity to a particular scenario "calls for assessments of
intentions and conditions bearing upon the likelihood of attack."1 42
The nature of necessity is that it is often interposed with the
"imminence" factor.143 One scholar explains the logical relation
between necessity and legal use of force in self-defense by
describing necessity to mean that "there must have been no other
feasible means of dealing with a particular threat."' 4 4 Notably, this
means that "force should not be considered necessary until
peaceful measures have been found wanting."' 4 5 As this comment
assesses a preemptive strike in defense of a potential nuclear
attack, the element of necessity-as separate from an analysis of
imminence-will primarily address whether "peaceful measures"
are still available to Israel.
Proportionality assesses the appropriateness of a nation's
action in response to a perceived threat. 4 6  Thus, an ex ante
analysis of proportionality is not immediately relevant when
attempting to predict the legality of a future act of self-defense.
However, as proportionality is an integral component to the
legality of inter-state uses of force, understanding the role
proportionality plays in lawful acts of anticipatory self-defense is
still pertinent to this comment's analysis. The requirement of
proportionality means that "[a]cts done in self-defense must not
exceed in manner or aim the necessity provoking them."' 47
Another scholar notes that "a forcible response must be limited to
removing that threat, and cannot extend beyond this defensive
140 See Schachter, supra note 106, at 1635.
141 AREND & BECK, supra note 14, at 72.
142 See id.
143 See Rockefeller, supra note 134, at 142 ("The requirement of imminence is
meant to assure the necessity of an act.") (quoted in Sadoff, Striking, supra note 10, at
475 n.158).
144 Andrew Garwood-Gowers, Israel's Airstrike on Syria's Al-Kibar Facility: A
Test Case for the Doctrine of Pre-emptive Self-Defense? 16 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 263,
280 (2011).
145 See Schachter, supra note 106, at 1635.
146 See id at 1638.
147 Id. at 1637.
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objective to encompass the pursuit of broader offensive or
strategic goals." 48  An act in self-defense that exceeds the bare
minimum necessary to respond to the threat risks becoming a
retaliatory act, and thus unlawful under customary international
law.149 Simply put, a nation's "counter-attack" must not amount to
a reprisal for the purpose of revenge or as a penalty."so
Proportionality is also relevant to the theoretical implications
of anticipatory self-defense. In its pure form, proportionality
dictates that "harm returned should not exceed harm received."15'
Inherent in this concept is that an attack as deterrence is actually at
odds with this precept of proportionality, as the purpose of an
attack meant to deter is that "the greater the disproportionality, the
greater the chance of avoiding harm to either party by avoiding
conflict altogether."'5 2 Thus, the element of proportionality serves
as the essential limit on the acts that nations may engage in when
using force in anticipatory self-defense.
For the purposes of this comment's analysis, "necessity" is
limited to assessing whether Israel has exhausted all available
peaceful means' and "proportionality" is limited to exploring the
limits of any acts Israel would be permitted to take in defending
itself against a nuclear strike.
2. Imminence
Imminence is "the most problematic variable of anticipatory
self-defense ... that has no precise definition in international
law."' 54 However, the importance that imminence plays in the
legitimacy of using force in anticipatory self-defense is clear. As
one scholar recognizes:
It is important that the right of self-defense should not freely
148 Garwood-Gowers, supra note 144, at 281.
149 See Schachter, supra note 106, at 1637.
150 See id. at 1638.
151 See Jason S. Wrachford, The 2006 Israeli Invasion of Lebanon: Aggression,
Self-Defense, or a Reprisal Gone Bad? 60 A.F. L. REV. 29, 74. (2007) (quoting Michael
J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539, 552 (2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
152 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
153 See supra notes 140-145 and accompanying text.
154 varc, supra note 67, at 182.
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allow the use of force in anticipation of an attack or in response
to a threat. At the same time, we must recognize that there may
well be situations in which the imminence of an attack is so
clear. . . that defensive action is essential for self-
preservation. 1s
Illustrating its role in customary international law, the absence
of imminence was indeed determinative when the International
Military Tribunals at Nuremberg applied the Caroline test
following World War II, rejecting Germany's proffered
justification that their "invasion of Norway had been an act of
anticipatory self-defense."' 5 6 Today, however, the doctrinal debate
surrounding the legality of states using force in anticipatory self-
defense stems primarily from the varying definitions and meanings
of "imminence."' 5 7 Thus, imminence becomes the most essential
factor to define when determining whether a use of force in self-
defense is permissible,'"' and is therefore the primary question in
analyzing whether Israel would be presently justified to strike
Iran's nuclear program.
The notion of imminence in customary international law
reaches back to the Caroline incident.' Under the Caroline
doctrine, "[a]n attack must be apparent in certain terms, and the
impending harm must be of such an immediate nature that instant
armed force is the only way to ward off the blow."6 o This standard
for imminence focuses on the temporal aspect and is strictly
measured.16' An imminent attack, strictly measured, is one that is
"just about to occur or, in other words, when '[a]n attack is in
evidence."" 6 2 Scholars have suggested that the imminence of an
attack can rise to such urgency that use of force in anticipatory
self-defense would fall within the stricture of Article 51.163
155 Schachter, supra note 106, at 1634 (emphasis added).
156 See Greenwood, supra note 61, at 13, 15.
157 See Anderson, supra note 68, at 267. The clearest modem example of the role
imminence plays and the vagueness of it definition is seen in the Osirak incident of 1981,
discussed infra Part IIC.
158 See Anderson, supra note 68, at 267.
159 See Greenwood, supra note 61, at 15; see also Anderson, supra note 68, at 271.
160 Anderson, supra note 68, at 272.
161 See varc, supra note 67, at 182.
162 See id. at 182-83 (citing O'Connell, supra note 86).
163 See Waldock, supra note 78, at 498 ("Where there is convincing evidence not
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Many scholars are now arguing that a relevant measurement of
imminence, however, should no longer be strictly temporal.' 6 The
strict requirement is out of touch with "the realities of modem
military conditions." 65  The nature of imminence has been
affected in two significant ways since the development of the
Caroline doctrine.16 6 First, the "gravity of the threat" has changed
significantly.'6 7  Today we face nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction that have the capacity to destroy a
nation before it ever has a chance to defend itself.168 This is vastly
different from the "cross-border raids conducted by men armed
only with rifles" that were the predominant form of international
uses of force at the time of the Caroline incident.'16  Second, the
method of delivering an attack has changed.'70 With increased
rapidity of an attack reaching its target once launched, it is now
"far more difficult to determine the time scale within which a
threat of attack .. . would materialize."l 7' Within this framework,
Professor Greenwood asserts that in order to justify the existence
of an "imminent threat," there must be sufficient evidence that
"the threat of attack exists . . . [requiring] evidence not only of the
possession of weapons but also of an intention to use them." 72
Customary international law is, by its very nature, an
important groundwork for establishing the bounds on inter-state
actions. 173 Nevertheless, it has many shortcomings as a framework
merely of threats and potential danger but of an attack being actually mounted, then an
armed attack may be said to have begun to occur, though it has not passed the
frontier .. . If an armed attack is imminent within the strict doctrine of the Caroline, then
it would seem to bring the case within Article 51.").
164 See, e.g., Svarc, supra note 67, at 182-83.
165 See Greenwood, supra note 61, at 15.




170 Id. at 15.
171 Greenwood, supra note 61, at 16.
172 Id. (emphasis added).
173 The nature of customary international law is described as principles resulting
"from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: SOURCES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 102 (1987) ("[C]ustomary international law results from a general
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.").
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to assess the legality of using force in self-defense. While strict
interpretation of the U.N. Charter's restriction on using force in
self-defense is often too restrictive, 17 4 customary international law
suffers from being too vague to serve as a guide for state actors.'7 5
Additionally, it may be "out of sync" with the realities of a state's
reasoning and behavior when facing threats to their very
survival.'17  Thus, scholars began to look for, or propose,
alternatives.
B. Alternative Framework
The scholarly landscape concerned with anticipatory self-
defense is consumed with widespread disagreement, from
expansivist-restrictionist doctrinal dichotomies17 to inconsistent
definitions of prevention, preemption, anticipatory self-defense,"'
and the very factors of necessity, proportionality and imminence'7 9
that are essential to this vast doctrinal theory of international law.
However, there is one observation on which all scholars can
perhaps agree: at present, the international arena does not have a
practicable framework to consistently evaluate the legality or
legitimacy of a nation's use of force in anticipatory self-defense.
As a result, several scholars have proffered a variety of proposals
to compensate for the vagueness of customary international law
and the unrealistic restrictiveness of the U.N. Charter in assessing
anticipatory self-defense. Though several proposals have been
offered by numerous scholars,' this comment limits its
174 See supra Part I.B.3.
175 See Sadoff, Striking, supra note 10, at 446.
176 See id. at 463. To illustrate this point, when Israel was criticized for striking
Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor, discussed infra Part III.C, the Israeli Ambassador
responded that "[tlo assert the applicability of the Caroline principles to a State
confronted with the threat of nuclear destruction would be an emasculation of that
State's inherent and natural right of self-defence." See id at 463 n.103 (emphasis
added) (citing Michael Skopets, Comment, Battered Nation Syndrome: Relaxing the
Imminence Requirement of Self-Defense in International Law, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 753,
771 (2005)).
177 See supra Part I.B.3.
178 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
179 See supra Part II.A.
Iso See e.g., DOYLE, supra note 2 (proposing standards as criteria for the
international community to consider in evaluating the legality of preventive uses of
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consideration to the framework proposed by David Sadoff, which
focuses its proposal specifically to assessing use of force in
anticipatory, rather than preventive, self-defense.
1. David Sadoff "Striking a Sensible Balance"
Sadoff proposes an alternative legal framework to assess the
legality of "proactive defense," which encompasses interceptive,
anticipatory and preemptive self-defense.'"' His analysis, while
derived from customary international law, seeks to expand on this
doctrine to produce a "clear, practicable legal standard to govern
the use of first strikes."l82 The substantive components of the
proposed framework include (1) properly gauging the threat, (2)
exhausting peaceful alternatives, and (3) taking responsive
action."' As the second and third components tend to follow the
same considerations as under a traditional customary international
law analysis, this comment describes only the first component in
depth.
In order to gauge the threat of attack, Sadoff proposes
analyzing the (i) nature and scale, (ii) likelihood, and (iii) timing
of the threat.'84 With a state gauging the threat of attack, Sadoff
calls for establishing an evidentiary standard to "address[] the
nature, quality, and reliability of a state's information about the
underlying facts and circumstances that have led it to decide to act
against a given threat.""' He proposes that the evidentiary
standard requires a state to show "with clear and compelling
evidence the existence of a serious and urgent need with respect to
force); Amos N. Guiora, Anticipatory Self-Defense and International Law-A Re-
Evaluation, 13 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 3 (2008) (proposing a framework to evaluate
the legitimacy of anticipatory self-defense by a state against non-state actors); Nicholas
C. Newman, When to Use Force? A Law and Economics Framework of Anticipatory
Self-Defense Against Rogue State Nuclear Attack Under International Law (2008-2009)
(unpublished Master thesis, European Master in Law & Economics, Universities of
Hamburg, Bologna and Haifa) (on file at http://www.emle.org) (presenting a law and
economics framework to calculate the optimal timing for a preemptive strike).
181 See Sadoff, Striking, supra note 10, at 444.
182 See id at 444.
183 See id at 442.
184 Id. at 470.
185 See id at 478.
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a given threat."' 8 6
The first two prongs of a state's assessment using Sadoff's
framework appear to go to the necessity element of the Caroline
doctrine. When assessing the nature and scale of a potential
attack, a state will need to consider (1) "the character and
magnitude" of the threatened attack (including (a) the type of
weapons the enemy may use, (b) the size of an army, or (c)
whether it would be an invasion or an isolated attack); (2) whether
or not there would be warning; (3) what the likely targets of an
attack would be; and (4) what the impact of an attack would be on
the state's capacity to defend itself."'
In assessing the likelihood of an attack, Sadoff explains that a
state would assess the probability of whether the attack would in
fact occur if there were no "proactive defense" measures taken.
The analysis by the target state would be subjective, in that it
considers the state-actor's perceptions of the "intent and
capabilities of the presumed aggressor state."" 9 The author
recommends using an "operational assessment" of likelihood (e.g.,
when the attacking state's "decision to attack has become
'effectively irrevocable"'), rather than a probability-based
assessment (e.g., "'reasonable certainty' or 'highly probable'"). 19 0
An operational-based standard would be a higher threshold than a
probability-based standard, so that defensive actions are
186 Id. at 480 (internal quotation marks omitted).
187 Sadoff, Striking, supra note 10, at 471.
188 See id at 473.
189 Id. Sadoff suggests several questions that would be useful for a country making
this assessment:
(1) Has the presumed aggressor publicly expressed its will to attack or has
intelligence confirmed as much? (2) Has it arrayed or deployed forces such that
they are poised to attack? What lessons can be gleaned based on historical
experience and what insights can be gained from the leadership profile of the
enemy? (3) Does the presumed aggressor have vital national interests or
powerful domestic political concerns that might make it more likely to attack?
(4) What is the status of any ongoing negotiations between the states at issue,
and has the United Nations, any military pact, or a global or regional power
expressed a willingness to intervene? (5) What is the presumed aggressor's
overall technical competence, and does it believe it has the military strength
sufficient to achieve its objectives?
Id.
190 Id. at 474.
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appropriate when the question of attack is not if an attack will
occur, but when-"the uncertainty lies in whether the attack will
occur sooner rather than later."l 91 Such a high threshold would
surely satisfy the "necessity" prong of the Caroline doctrine.'92
An assessment of "timing" is an important consideration
because it addresses the urgency of a potential defensive action.193
This factor appears to go to the imminence prong of the Caroline
doctrine. Sadoff advocates mandating a "last window of
opportunity" approach in the timing analysis, meaning that a
defensive action would be appropriate when "a present danger ...
is known and ... [when] any additional delay in acting would
'seriously compromise security.'" 9 4 He advocates this approach
over requiring "temporal imminence" because "the underlying
rationale of the imminence requirement is to ensure military action
is truly necessary."'
Sadoff brings a "realist" approach to the matter of assessing
when using force in anticipatory self-defense would be
appropriate.' 96 He appropriately notes that the standards currently
employed under customary international law and the Caroline
doctrine are "too limited in scope to be of general use" and lack
the details needed for utility purposes.1 97  Furthermore, his
suggested framework provides numerous questions and factors
that would provide practical guidance to nations considering using
'9' Id.
192 Id
193 Sadoff, Striking, supra note 10, at 475.
194 Id. (citing Beth M. Polebaum, National Self-Defense in International Law: An
Emerging Standard for a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 187, 211 (1984)).
195 Id. (citing Rockefeller, supra note 134, at 142). Sadoff lists the following
factors to consider when assessing timing:
(1) the nature and extent of military developments or location of military
deployments by the presumed aggressor; (2) the political rhetoric or public
expressions of intent by the presumed aggressor; (3) the capability of the
presumed aggressor to mount the type of attack anticipated; (4) the status of
diplomatic negotiations (if any) between the presumed aggressor and the target
state; and (5) the geographical distance the attack would cover, based on the
location of the assets to be employed and the likely targets.
Id. at 477-78.
196 Id
197 Id. at 446.
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force in "proactive defense."' This guidance would also enable
the international community to consistently evaluate the
legitimacy of a nation's use of force.'" As Sadoff remarks, this
would enable third parties to "cast their military and diplomatic
support accordingly behind the state whose conduct more closely
conformed to international law."200
2. Considering Legitimacy
Legitimacy is vital to the success of any legal order.2 0' In the
present context, legitimacy refers to the "the anticipated reaction
of the relevant international community to a State's decision to use
force."20 2 In 2004, the U.N. Secretary-General's High-Level Panel
on Threats, Challenges and Change2 03  observed that "[t]he
effectiveness of the global collective security system . .. depends
ultimately not only on the legality of decisions but also on the
common perception of their legitimacy." 2 04 The panel notes that if
either "common global understanding" or "acceptance" of when
use of force is both legal and legitimate is lacking, the result will
be a weaker international legal order.20 5
In realist terms, however, legitimacy and legality are often
separate considerations.206 An act that is considered legitimate
198 See id. at 443-44.
199 Sadoff, Striking, supra note 10, at 446.
200 Id.
201 See, e.g., David Dyzenhaus, The Legitimacy of Legality, 46 U. TORONTO L.J.
129 (1996) (exploring whether "legal" is synonymous with "legitimate"); Tania Voon,
Closing the Gap Between Legitimacy and Legality of Humanitarian Intervention:
Lessons from East Timor and Kosovo, 7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 31 (2002-
2003) (clarifying the importance of legitimacy's role in forming international law).
202 ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, THE BEST DEFENSE? LEGITIMACY & PREVENTIVE FORCE
104 (2010) [hereinafter SOFAER, THE BEST DEFENSE].
203 The Panel was convened in 2004 by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan "to
assess current threats to international peace and security; to evaluate ... existing policies
and institutions[;] . . . and to make recommendations." High-level Panel Report, supra
note 9, 3.
204 Id. 1 204. The panel also observed that "[t]he maintenance of world peace and
security depends importantly on there being a common global understanding, and
acceptance, of when the application of force is both legal and legitimate." Id. 1 184.
205 See id 184.
206 See SOFAER, THE BEST DEFENSE, supra note 202, at 103-05. In the international
context, the ineffectiveness of legal standards and the subsequent "frequent disregard" of
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may not always be deemed legal, and an act that is legal may not
always be considered legitimate. 207  Legitimacy differs from
legality on several points. First, legitimacy is established by the
"actual views and values of [s]tates and other relevant parties"
rather than by the academic or professional opinions of
international legal scholars on the meaning of the U.N. Charter.208
Second, legitimacy differs from legality in that it is usually a
"relative judgment, rather than a definitively positive or negative
one."209 The very nature of legitimacy is that it turns on numerous
factors, rather than requiring that "certain standards be met" as
with legality. 21 0  Third, an assessment of legitimacy should
consider not only the views of other nation states, but the views of
non-state entities such as international agencies, non-governmental
groups, the press and the public.2 11
The U.N. High-Level Panel, however, has demonstrated a
recognition of the vital importance of legitimacy by citing five
criteria that the Security Council should always address when
deciding whether to authorize or endorse the use of force: (1)
"seriousness of threat," (2) "proper purpose," (3) "last resort," (4)
"proportional means," and (5) "balance of consequences."2 12 For
the first criterion, "seriousness of threat," the question to pose is,
"Is the threatened harm to State or human security of a kind, and
sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima facie the use of
military force?" 2 13 Inquiry regarding "proper purpose" begs the
question "Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed
military action is to halt or avert the threat in question?" 214 "Last
resort" is relatively straight-forward, and asks whether "every non-
these standards have resulted in legitimacy being used as a "supplement or substitute for
strict legality." See id at 103.
207 See id at 105. One example of when a legal action was not necessarily
considered legitimate is when the Security Council decided to block Muslim Kosovars
from obtaining weapons, because this allowed "well-armed Serbs to massacre Muslims
without meaningful resistance." Id.
208 Id. at 104.
209 Id at 105.
210 See id.
211 See SOFAER, THE BEST DEFENSE, supra note 202, at 105.
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military option for meeting the threat in question [has] been
explored, with reasonable grounds for believing that other
measures will not succeed." 215  This criterion can be viewed as
synonymous with an analysis of "necessity." 216  "Proportional
means" predictably refers to proportionality: "Are the scale,
duration and intensity of the proposed military action the
minimum necessary to meet the threat in question?"2 17 The final
criterion recommended by the Panel, "balance of consequences,"
goes to the heart of the legitimacy inquiry.218 The Panel illustrates
this inquiry by posing whether "there [is] a reasonable chance of
the military action being successful in meeting the threat in
question, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse
than the consequences of inaction." 2 19 This is essentially the age-
old question, "Will the proposed action do more harm than
good?" 220 Sofaer recommends that when answering this question,
one "should go beyond the immediate, physical effects of a
particular action and take into account the long-term, ethical
consequences."221
The Caroline doctrine has been a pillar in the development of
customary international law's analysis of anticipatory self-defense.
However, widespread debate on the relationship between this
doctrine and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter has created a vague
understanding of what constitutes the strict bounds of legality
when using force in self-defense. While alternative frameworks
effectively address the doctrinal weaknesses of the Caroline
doctrine and customary international law, understanding
215 Id.
216 SOFAER, THE BEST DEFENSE, supra note 202, at 112.
217 High-level Panel Report, supra note 9, 1207.
218 See SOFAER, THE BEST DEFENSE, supra note 202, at 124.
219 High-level Panel Report, supra note 9, 1207.
220 See SOFAER, THE BEST DEFENSE, supra note 202, at 125.
221 Id. at 125-26. In addition to the five criteria put forward by the Panel, Sofaer
also discusses two additional criteria: "international support" and "confidence in findings
and conclusions." Id at 115-17, 120-24. For the first, Sofaer emphasizes the legitimacy
of any action that is endorsed by the Security Council. See id. at 115. The U.N. High-
Level Panel, to be sure, would likely argue that this is a prerequisite for international
legitimacy. Sofaer however, suggests it as merely a supplementary consideration. See
id at 116. For the second, Sofaer discusses the importance of reliable intelligence,
referring to the impact of mistaken intelligence on the perceived legitimacy of U.S.
involvement in Iraq in 2003. Id. at 120-23.
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international reactions to past incidents of anticipatory self-
defense is essential. Analysis of these incidents will illustrate the
bounds of legality and legitimacy within the international
community and provide insight on how an alternative framework
would be applied to future incidents.
IV. Anticipatory Self-Defense: Examples and Incidents
Without a clear legal framework to guide an evaluation of
using force in anticipatory self-defense, modern day incidents of
"non-reactive force" used in anticipatory self-defense are crucial
to answering two essential questions: First, are there instances in
which the use of anticipatory self-defense would be recognized as
legitimate, and secondly, where would the line be drawn to
distinguish acceptable and unacceptable uses of force? Four
examples of nations using force in anticipatory self-defense have
been generally recognized and analyzed as such since the adoption
of the U.N. Charter.222 These examples shed light on the current
acceptance or rejection of the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense
and provide a baseline to examine whether the current situation
between Israel and Iran might give rise to a legitimate use of
anticipatory self-defense.
A. 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis
In 1962, the U.S.S.R. sent "over 100 shiploads of armaments"
222 In addition to the incidents discussed here, the military efforts of the United
States in Afghanistan (and to some extent, in Iraq) since the events of September 11,
2001, have also been analyzed and discussed in the context of the legitimacy and legality
of anticipatory self-defense. See, e.g., Mikael Nabati, International Law at a
Crossroads: Self-Defense, Global Terrorism, and Preemption (A Call to Rethink the
Self-Defense Normative Framework), 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 771
(2003); O'Connell, supra note 86; Shah, supra note 37. Discussions of these military
efforts and justifications, while bearing legitimate relevance to the discussion at hand,
are based on preventive use of force in combatting terrorism. We are confining our
current analysis to the use of force between nation states, however, and are thereby
consciously excluding U.S. military efforts against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and
elsewhere from our examples. For a sample of the scholarly commentary regarding the
legitimacy of preventive uses of force and "the Bush doctrine," established in 2002 to
address the threat of global terrorism, compare Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, The
"Bush Doctrine": Can Preventive War Be Justified?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 843
(2009) with W. Michael Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, The Past and Future of the
Claim ofPreemptive Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 525 (2006).
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to Cuba, which included numerous launch missile sites. 223 The
United States responded by creating a naval quarantine around
Cuba, so that all ships going to Cuba would be inspected and no
ships with weapons would be allowed to pass through.2 24 In the
course of the quarantine, no ships tried to get around the
quarantine, no ships were seized, and only one ship was boarded
without incident.22 5 One day after announcing the quarantine, the
United States asked for and received regional support from the
Organization of American States (OAS). 226
The United States did not seek to justify the act on the basis of
Article 5 1.227 Nor did the United States claim that the U.S.S.R.'s
posturing with Cuba's cooperation was unlawful.22 8 Instead, the
United States relied on Article 52 to justify its actions, citing its
use of "regional arrangements . .. relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security." 2 29 International reactions to the
legality of the quarantine reflected "ideological lines," with Chile,
China, France, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela
supporting the quarantine, and Ghana, Romania, the Soviet Union,
and Egypt opposing it. 230
As this incident involved a non-reactive use of force, a brief
Caroline analysis is relevant.231' The element of necessity may
have been present, as the gravity of the threat (proximity of
nuclear missiles) was immense.23 2 Nevertheless, all peaceful
measures may not have been exhausted. The proportionality
element seems to be met, in that almost no force was actually
used.233 Satisfying the imminence requirement is more difficult
because it is not clear that using force was the only way "to ward
223 Sadoff, A Question, supra note 47, at 563-64.
224 Id. at 564.
225 Id. (citing FRANCK, supra note 81, at 99 n.9).
226 Id.; FRANCK, supra note 81, at 99.
227 Id. at 565.
228 Id
229 Sadoff, supra note 47, at 565 (quoting U.N. Charter art. 52).
230 Id at 566 (citing ALEXANDROV, supra note 44, at 156 n. 174).
231 Id at 565.
232 See id. at 564 (discussing the increased number of missiles that would need only
minutes to reach U.S. targets from Cuba versus hours from Soviet territory).
233 See id.
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off the blow."2 34 The possession of weapons and a clear intention
to use them, at least as a threat against the United States, however,
were clearly present.2 35 Regarding the reaction of the international
community, "very few [states] ... relied on a strict interpretation
of Articles 2(4), 51, and 53."236 Thus, even though this incident
does not suggest either "clear acceptance or rejection" of
anticipatory self-defense, it demonstrates that in 1962, states were
not interpreting the U.N. Charter in a clearly "restrictive" way. 23 7
B. 1967 Six Day War238
Scholars have described the Six Day War between Israel and
Egypt as a "classic case of military preemption." 23 9  In 1967,
tensions were rising between Israel and its Arab neighbors.2 4 0
Leading up to the incident of June 5, 1967, five overt acts
indicated that Egypt would launch an attack on Israel. 24 ' First,
Egypt mobilized troops along Israel's Sinai border "to an
unprecedented extent."2 42  Second, Egypt began cementing ties
with Jordan, Syria and Iraq.243 Third, the Egyptian president
ordered U.N. Emergency Force troops to leave Sinai, where they
had been deployed as a buffer between Egypt and Israel.24
Fourth, Egypt imposed a blockade of the Straits of Tiran, a
waterway vital to Israeli shipping.245  Lastly, the Egyptian
234 Anderson, supra note 68, at 272; see also supra note 161 and accompanying
text.
235 See Sadoff, A Question, supra note 47, at 564 (discussing how intelligence
photography revealed launching sites and movable delivery vehicles capable of
deploying nuclear weapons).
236 FRANCK, supra note 81, at 101.
237 Sadoff, A Question, supra note 47, at 566.
238 This incident has also been referred to as "Israeli-Arab War (1967)." FRANCK,
supra note 81, at 101.
239 Raymond & Kegley, supra note 12, at 102. Note, however, that the authors' use




242 Sadoff, A Question, supra note 47, at 566; Raymond & Kegley, supra note 12,
at 102.
243 Raymond & Kegley, supra note 12, at 102.
244 Id.; Sadoff, A Question, supra note 47, at 566; FRANCK, supra note 81, at 101.
245 See Sadoff, A Question, supra note 47, at 567; Raymond & Kegley, supra note
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president proclaimed that in any war with Israel, Egypt's goal
would be "the destruction of the Jewish state." 246 The final result
of this buildup was that on June 5, Israel launched a "surprise" air
attack on Egypt's forces that resulted in a "decisive victory" in a
matter of days.24 7
In the ensuing period, Israel first claimed that Egypt had made
the first move.248 Shortly thereafter, however, this argument lost
weight and Israel made the alternative claim that the blockade
represented an "act of war" and the deployments of troops
appeared to be an imminent attack. 249 Thus, though Israel's attack
on Egypt was an act of anticipatory self-defense in substance,
Israel did not rely on this doctrine to justify its actions.2 50
International reaction was generally supportive of Israel, though
some states viewed the incident as an act of aggression by Israel.2 5 1
Despite the fact that the "primary facts" demonstrated a clear
example of anticipatory self-defense,2 52 no state cited the principle
12, at 102.
246 Raymond & Kegley, supra note 12, at 102.
247 Id.; Sadoff, A Question, supra note 47, at 567.
248 Sadoff, A Question, supra note 47, at 567; GRAY, supra note 46, at 161.
249 Sadoff, A Question, supra note 47, at 567.
250 FRANCK, supra note 81, at 104. Israel instead based its justification on actual
self-defense. Id. Some scholars find this fact significant in the debate over the legality
of such acts. See GRAY, supra note 46, at 161 ("This reluctance expressly to invoke
anticipatory self-defence is in itself a clear indication of the doubtful status of this
justification for the use of force.").
251 Sadoff, A Question, supra note 47, at 567-68. Morocco, Syria and the Soviet
Union all viewed Israel's acts as acts of aggression. Id. In a particularly condemnatory
remark at the U.N. Security Council meeting of June 19, 1981, Uganda rejected "Israel's
dangerous notion of the doctrine of self-defense, under which it claims the right to attack
a Member State on the basis of the speculative conjecture that a nation engaged in
peaceful scientific research might possibly, at an unforeseen time, use its technology for
offensive purposes." U.N. SCOR, 14th Sess., 2288th mtg. 145, S/PV.228 (June 18,
1981). The support for Israel's actions was reflected in the U.N. debates, in which
Israel's self-defensive acts were not condemned. See Sadoff, A Question, supra note 47,
at 567-68 (internal citations omitted). Furthermore, the U.N. Security Council itself
"notably did not call for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from newly occupied territory."
See FRANCK, supra note 81, at 102 (citing S.C. Res. 234, U.N. Doc. S/RES/234 (June 7,
1967)).
252 These "primary facts" include the facts that "Israel had not yet been attacked
militarily when it launched its first strikes ... [and] had not begun to exhaust its
diplomatic remedies [regarding Egypt's blockade of the Straits of Tiran]. Its attack on
Egypt was in anticipation of an armed attack, not a reaction to it." FRANCK, supra note
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of anticipatory self-defense in its support.2 53
In a Caroline analysis of this incident, necessity,
proportionality and imminence all appear to be present. For the
necessity requirement, Israel was facing the possibility of
invasion, as evidenced by the amassing of the troops along its
Sinai border.2 54  The proportionality of the response also seems
appropriate, as the duration of the armed engagement was only six
days and the attack was limited to Egypt's military forces.25 5
Furthermore, the mobilization of troops, the blockade, the removal
of U.N. troops, and the accompanying threatening remarks by the
Egyptian president all strongly indicate the imminence of an
invasion.
Though there was a lack of consensus in the international
community regarding the legitimacy of anticipatory self-defense,
Israel's actions were widely viewed as legitimate when the
customary international law elements of necessity, proportionality
and imminence were all present.256
C. 1981 Israeli Attack on Osirak 257 Nuclear Reactor
The Osirak incident has been described as an example of
"preemptive" force.2 58 In early 1981, Iraq was constructing a
nuclear reactor near Baghdad, "code-named Osirak." 25 9  Israel
viewed the Osirak reactor as "a threat to Israel's survival."2 6 0 The
type of reactor used and the type of fuel purchased could both be
81, at 104-05 (emphasis added).
253 Sadoff, A Question, supra note 47, at 567-68.
254 Id. at 567.
255 See id at 567.
256 The customary international law analysis of this incident is discussed below.
See infra Part IV.C. 1.
257 Note, "Osiraq" is also a commonly used spelling of the name of the Iraqi
nuclear reactor. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike Against the Osiraq
Reactor: A Retrospective, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 259 (1996); Louis Rend Beres &
Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Reconsidering Israel's Destruction of Iraq's Osiraq Nuclear
Reactor, 9 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 437 (1995).
258 Raymond & Kegley, supra note 12, at 101-03. The authors use the term
"preventive use of military force." Id.
259 Sadoff, A Question, supra note 47, at 568.
260 Raymond & Kegley, supra note 12, at 103.
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used in weapons manufacture. 261  Additionally, Israel noticed that
Iraq was buying more uranium than it would need for scientific
research.26 2 Iraqi leaders were expressing "vehement hostility" to
Israel.263 This last factor was augmented by the history of three
wars between Israel and Iraq and the fact that Iraq continued to
deny Israel's legal existence. 264 Lastly, the nature of the threat and
Israel's vulnerability to an initial strike were factors in Israel's
decision to act.265
On June 7, 1981, Israel attacked and destroyed the Iraqi
nuclear reactor.26 6 Israel said it acted to "remove a nuclear threat
to its existence."267 To justify its actions, Israel claimed
anticipatory self-defense.268 Though citing scholars' expansive
interpretation of Article 51, Israel was unable to cite any examples
of state practice of anticipatory self-defense. 2 69 The U.N. Security
Council, while not reaching a consensus on the matter of
anticipatory self-defense, did unanimously condemn the act as a
"clear violation" of the U.N. Charter and "the norms of
international conduct." 27 0 Individual states had varied reactions to
Israel's actions. Some states agreed with the doctrine of
anticipatory defense, but condemned the incident for lack of
imminence: there was no "instant and overwhelming need for self-
defense."2 7' Other states simply rejected the principle of
anticipatory self-defense.2 72 The United States condemned the
incident, citing the fact that peaceful means were not pursued,
given that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) did
not have evidence that the reactor would be used to develop
261 See id.
262 Sadoff, A Question, supra note 47, at 568.
263 Raymond & Kegley, supra note 12, at 103.
264 Sadoff, A Question, supra note 47, at 568.
265 See Raymond & Kegley, supra note 12, at 103.
266 Sadoff, A Question, supra note 47, at 569.
267 GRAY, supra note 46, at 163.
268 Id.
269 Sadoff, A Question, supra note 47, at 569.
270 Id. at 570 (internal citations omitted).
271 Id. These states include Sierra Leone, Malaysia, Uganda, Niger and the United
Kingdom. Id. at 569-70.
272 Id. at 569. These states include Iraq, Mexico, Egypt, Syria, Guyana, Pakistan,
Spain, and Yugoslovia. Id.
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nuclear weapons.27
Under a Caroline analysis, it can be argued that both necessity
and proportionality were present. The possibility of nuclear
armament and the state of hostilities between Israel and Iraq
suggest there could have been a grave threat to Israel, satisfying
the necessity prong of the Caroline doctrine. The action taken, a
targeted destruction of the "threat" (the nuclear reactor), seems to
meet the proportionality requirement.27 4 Imminence, however,
was clearly not present.275 The threat to Israel had not been "of
such an immediate nature that instant armed force [was] the only
way to ward off the blow." 27 6
From this incident, we have a possible recognition of the
principle of anticipatory self-defense, though it was not in fact
viewed to be present here.2 77
D. 2007 Israeli Attack on a Syrian Nuclear Facility
In the early hours of September 6, 2007, Israeli jets launched
an attack on an undisclosed target near Al-Kibar in north-eastern
Syria.278 While the Syrian government has never admitted it, the
general consensus of the international community is that the target
of the attack was a secret Syrian nuclear reactor, and that it was
destroyed in the attack. 2 79  The first official intelligence report
regarding the target was released by the United States in April
2008.280 This report stated that there was evidence as early as
spring 2007 that the Syrian target "was a nearly completed nuclear
reactor intended to produce plutonium for a weapons
programme." 281  The report also indicated that the complex was
273 Id. at 570.
274 See infra Part IV.C. 1.
275 See SOFAER, THE BEST DEFENSE, supra note 202, at 57.
276 Anderson, supra note 68, at 272.
277 Though this incident is generally recognized to not meet the requirements of
anticipatory self-defense under customary international law, several scholars have stated
that it may be justifiable under the doctrine of preemptive self-defense or under other
legitimacy reasons. See, e.g., DOYLE, supra note 2, at 78-84; SOFAER, THE BEST
DEFENSE, supra note 202, at 57.
278 Garwood-Gowers, supra note 144, at 266.
279 See id. at 266-67.
280 Id. at 267.
281 Id. at 268.
304 [Vol. XXXVIII
ISRAEL AND IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
"weeks and possibly months from operational capacity."282 To
support the intelligence conclusions of the United States, IAEA
investigators did discover plutonium particles at the Al-Kibar
site.283  The IAEA all but officially concluded that the Al-Kibar
site was a nuclear reactor when the IAEA Director General Yukiya
Amono "explicitly confirm[ed]" that the destroyed facility was "a
nuclear reactor under construction." 2 84
Interestingly, Syria's immediate reaction to the attack was
rather muted. On September 9, 2007, Syria registered an official
complaint with the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly,
asserting only that "Israel had committed a breach of the airspace
of the Syrian Arab Republic." 28 5  The complaint also asserted that
during the attack, Israel "dropped some munitions but without
managing to cause any human casualties or material damage."28 6
282 Id. (citing Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Background Briefing
with Senior U.S. Officials on Syria's Covert Nuclear Reactor and North Korea's
Involvement (Apr. 24, 2008), available at http://www.cfr.org/syrialbackground-briefing-
senior-is-officials-syrias-covert-nuclear-reactor-north-koreas-involvement/p 16105
(follow "Breifing" hyperlink for full document) (internal citations omitted)).
283 Id. at 268-69. Syria's reaction to the discovery of these plutonium particles was
to assert that they came "from Israeli missiles used in the airstrike." Id at 269. The
IAEA rejected this claim, however, saying that "the particles discovered at the site were
of a different composition to those found in uranium-based munitions." Id. (citing INT'L
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the
Syrian Arab Republic, GOV/2008/60 IT 7, 8, available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2008/syria-iaea gov-2008-
60_081119.htm).
284 See Garwood-Gowers, supra note 144, at 270 (citing The Associated Press,
Syria: U.N. Atomic Watchdog Director Says Bombed Syrian Site Was Reactor, N.Y.
TIMES, (Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/29/world/middleeast/29briefs-
Syria.html?scp-l&sq=associated%20press%20syria%20april%2029%20201 I&st-cse).
Immediately following the statement, however, the IAEA issued a "clarification," stating
that agency had not yet "reached the conclusion that the site was definitely a nuclear
reactor. Id. (citing Press Release, Int'l Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Clarification on
Syria (Apr. 28, 2011)), http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/
201 1/prn2Ol104.html).
285 Id. at 266 (citing Permanent Rep. of the Syrian Arab Republic to the U.N.,
Identical Letters Dated 9 Sept. 2007 from the Permanent Rep. of the Syrian Arab
Republic to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary General and The President of
the Security Council, U.N. Does S/2007/537; A/61/1041 (Sept. 9, 2007) [hereinafter
Syria Letter to U.N.] (internal quotation marks omitted)).
286 Id. (citing Syria Letter to U.N., supra note 285) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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More interestingly, the international reaction to the incident was
also muted. Israel itself, while eventually admitting that they were
responsible for the attack,287 did not provide any legal
justifications for the attack.288 While the United States issued
"tentative support" for the attack, no states other than Syria
condemned the incident.2 89
Professor Garwood-Gowers asserts that even under the
customary international law doctrine of anticipatory self-defense,
this attack on Syria is clearly unlawful under current international
law by failing to meet the requirements of necessity and
imminence.29 0 Specifically, he cites Israel's failure to "exhaust
peaceful means of resolving its concerns over Syria's nuclear
intentions" through either the IAEA or the U.N. Security
Council.2 9 1
In analyzing this incident, Garwood-Gowers seeks to evaluate
whether the state of modern international law regarding the use of
preventive force has changed.292 "If the international community's
response ... indicates general acceptance of a new practice or
interpretation, then it can be said that a change to customary
international law has taken place." 293  Garwood-Gowers explains
that any "significant opposition" would be enough to disrupt any
287 Id. at 267 (stating Israel "confirm[ed] that it had struck a target inside Syria but
refus[ed] to elaborate on the nature of the target. . . ") (citing Israel Admits Air Strike on
Syria, BBC NEWS (Oct. 2, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/7024287.stm)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
288 Id. at 279.
289 Garwood-Gowers, supra note 144, at 266-68. Even after the initial reports on
the incident, the only states to comment on the incident were Iran, Russia, and North
Korea. Id. at 266 (internal citations omitted).
290 See id. at 279-80.
291 Id. at 280.
292 Id. at 272.
293 Id. at 272. Garwood-Gowers also explains that if the prohibition on use of force
was attributed a jus cogens status, then it would take more than mere "general
acceptance" to change international law. Id Jus cogens are norms that are strong
enough to automatically void treaties that conflict with them. DINSTEIN, supra note 16,
at 93 ("[A] peremptory norm of general international law."). Jus cogens can be modified
only by "the emergence of a conflicting general custom [or treaty]." Id. at 96.
Specifically, Garwood-Gowers discusses whether the "Bush doctrine," the preventive
war approach adopted by the United States in 2002, has increased the international
legitimacy of preventive war actions. Id at 275-79.
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display of "general acceptance," indicating that international law
remains unchanged. 2 94 He concludes that while there is still no
"general acceptance" sufficient to mark a shift in international law,
the incident does reflect a shift in state practice that "indicate[s] a
broader lack of concern over the legality of relatively minor uses
of force." 295 The muted reaction by the international community
may demonstrate that even though such an attack may be illegal
under current international law, it may be that the international
community does not view the incident as illegitimate.
These incidents do not clearly demonstrate that using of force
in anticipatory self-defense is definitively legal, or even legitimate,
under modern international law. Yet they provide guidance as to
what situations do and do not warrant use of non-reactive force in
the eyes of this same international community. 29 6 The Six Day
War strongly suggests that there are situations in which "non-
reactive" uses of force would be widely seen as legitimate.29 7
Overt preparations for attack, as in the Cuban Missile Crisis and
the Six Day War, appear to warrant acts bordering on "unlawful"
under the restrictive interpretation of Article 2(4)'s prohibition on
the use of force. 29 8  These situations are thus more likely to
warrant acceptance of using force in anticipatory self-defense.
Nevertheless, overt hostility with the mere possibility of nuclear
weapon development, such as in the Osirak incident,29 9 does not
appear to automatically warrant the use of force.
These various incidents thus provide real world examples of
what the international community would consider necessary,
proportionate, and imminent. The most controversial element
seems to be imminence. These incidents provide the baseline to
which the three prongs of the Caroline doctrine can be applied in
evaluating whether the present conflict between Israel and Iran
constitutes such imminence as would justify a preemptive strike.
294 Id. at 272.
295 Garwood-Gowers, supra note 144, at 290.
296 See id.
297 Id. Garwood-Gowers proposes that "the international community may now be
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V. Today: Israel and Iran
A. History
While it may be hard to believe in today's era of hostility and
threat, history reveals that Israel and Iran have not always been
enemies. In World War II, Iranian diplomats helped save
"thousands of Jews" from the Holocaust." Iran was one of the
first Muslim nations to establish economic and trade ties with
Israel.30' Indeed, Iran has a long history of "Jews [being] welcome
members of Iranian society."302 The two states were allies for a
period spanning almost three decades, united by the common
"enemy" of Sunni Arabs.303 The friendly economic ties between
the two nations changed in 1979 with Iran's Islamic Revolution.304
The Ayatollah that ousted the Shah in the revolution preached
strong anti-Israeli rhetoric, setting the stage for the severe decline
of Iran-Israel relations in modem Iran.305
This history of cooperation is a far cry from today's state of
affairs, where Iran proclaims a strong anti-Israeli stance. Iran's
support of Hamas and Hezbollah, two militant groups that seek the
destruction of Israel, exemplifies the current view of Iran towards
Israel and has often been cited by Israel in their reasons to need to
take defensive measures against Iran.30 6
B. Current Events
For Iran to be a threat to Israel, it has to have both the
capability to attack Israel with nuclear weapons and the intention
to do so.3 07
300 Stanley A. Weiss, Israel and Iran: The Bonds that Tie Persians and Jews, N.Y.
TIMES (July 10, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/10/opinion/I0iht-
edweiss.2165689.html.
301 Id.
302 S. Rob Sobhani, Israel's Iran Dilemma, WASH. TIMES (May 20, 2011),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/201 1/may/20/israels-iran-dilemma/.
303 Weiss, supra note 300.
304 Id
305 See Sabhani, supra note 302.
306 For a summary of the history of conflict between Israel, Lebanon, and the
Hezbollah, including a discussion of the 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, see
Wrachford, supra note 151.
307 See supra text accompanying note 172.
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1. Capability: Iran's Nuclear Development
Towards the end of 2011 and into the early part of 2012, world
tensions concerning Iran's nuclear program mounted quite
dramatically.3 0 s Iran's nuclear program has been a controversial
issue since the program's "re-birth" in the 1990s.3 09 Though Iran
is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,310 members
of the international community have long been suspicious of the
purposes underlying Iran's clandestine nuclear research." Many
worry that Iran is seeking to develop nuclear weapons.3 12 Yet Iran
has consistently asserted that its nuclear program is purely for
peaceful purposes."'
The most recent round of mounting tensions was marked by a
November 2011 IAEA report314 indicating Iran may be "carry[ing]
out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear device.""
The report was "the harshest judgment that United Nations
weapons inspectors had ever issued" against Iran's program.3 16 It
reports that Iran is employing a variety of "research, development
and testing activities . . . that would be useful in designing a
nuclear weapon."' It does not, however, provide an estimate on
308 Times Topic: Iran's Nuclear Program, N.Y. TIMES (last updated Oct. 15, 2012),
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/nuclearpro
gram/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=iran%20nuclear/ 20program&st-cse [hereinafter
Times Topic]. ("Iran's nuclear program is one of the most polarizing issues in one of the
world's most volatile regions.").
309 Id. The nuclear program actually first began in the 1960s, but was abandoned
after the Islamic Revolution in 1979. It was reinstated in the 1990s. Id.
310 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
311 See Times Topic, supra note 308.
312 See id.
313 Rick Gladstone, Iran Says It May Move Uranium Enrichment to "Safer Places,"
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/world/
middleeast/iran-may-move-some-nuclear-work-to-safer-
places.html?scp=2&sq=israel%20iran%20nuclear&st=cse.
314 February IAEA Report, supra note 6.
315 David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, U.N Agency Says Iran Data Points to A-
Bomb Work, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/09/world/un-
details-case-that-iran-is-at-work-on-nuclear-device.htm?ref -global-home (internal
quotation marks omitted).
316 Times Topic, supra note 308.
317 See Sanger & Broad, supra note 315.
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how long it will be before Iran develops nuclear weapons.' 8 Yet
should Iran enrich its uranium to 90%, it would have enough
enriched uranium for four nuclear weapons." 9 A separate report
estimates that Iran could develop nuclear weapons in sixty-two
days or less.320
Following the release of the November IAEA report, the
United States and Europe began a series of economic sanctions
intending to derail Iran's nuclear development.3 21 The sanctions
target both Iran's access to foreign banks and financial institutions,
as well as companies involved in Iran's nuclear, oil, and
322petrochemical industries. These sanctions appear to have an
effect on Iran's economy.3 2 3 Iranian leaders, in response to the
strains on the economy resulting from the sanctions, have been
making public statements encouraging "Iranian self-reliance and
resentment toward the West."3 24 Iran also threatened to close the
Strait of Hormuz, "a vital artery for transporting about one-fifth of
the world's oil supply." 32 5 Some commentators believe that these
"aggressive gestures" may demonstrate that Iranian leaders are
responding "frantically, and with increasing unpredictability" to
the sanctions.3 26
In February 2012, the IAEA released another report.327 This
318 See id.
319 KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32048, IRAN: U.S. CONCERNS
AND POLICY RESPONSES 30 (2011).
320 BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER, IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: STATUS AND
BREAKOUT TIMING 11 (2011), available at http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/
sites/default/files/Iran%2ONuclear/o20Program.pdf.
321 See, e.g., Annie Lowrey & David E. Sanger, U.S. Bets on Changing Iran's Tune
With New Sanctions Aimed at Lifeblood, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2012, at A6; Mark
Landler, U.S. and Its Allies Expand Sanctions Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2011,
at A6.
322 See Landler, supra note 321.
323 See Rick Gladstone, Tough Words from Iran as Sanctions Cut Deep, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2012, at A9; see also Lowrey & Sanger, supra note 321 (reporting oil
exports are down 20-30% and that the value of Iran's currency has sharply decreased).
324 See Gladstone, supra note 323.
325 David E. Sanger & Annie Lowrey, Iran Threatens to Choke Route of Oil
Shipments, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2011, at Al.
326 See Scott Shane & Robert F. Worth, Frantic Actions Hint At Pressure On Iran
Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2012, at Al.
327 See February IAEA Report, supra note 6.
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report indicates Iran may not be cooperating sufficiently with
IAEA, as Iran refused to grant the IAEA inspectors access to one
of their nuclear sites and dismissed IAEA's November concerns
because "Iran considered them to be based on unfounded
allegations."3 28  Most significantly, however, the report shows a
dramatic increase in Iran's production of enriched uranium: a
nearly 50% increase in Iran's stockpile since the IAEA's
November report.32 9 Iran already has enough enriched uranium to
build four nuclear weapons, should it attempt to build them.330
The report concludes by stating that the IAEA "is unable . . . to
conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities"
and "continues to have serious concerns regarding possible
military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme."33
The summer of 2012 saw an increase in concerns over the
volatility of the Israel-Iran situation. An August 2012 IAEA report
revealed that Iran has indeed completed installation of three-
quarters of the centrifuges it would need to develop "nuclear fuel"
in a deep underground site.332 Further, Iran has "cleansed" a site
that IAEA inspectors suspect was used to conduct "explosive
experiments that could be relevant to the production of a nuclear
weapon"-such a cleanup impedes the ability of IAEA inspectors
to determine what work exactly had been conducted at the site.33 3
These IAEA concerns have culminated in an official IAEA
resolution, passed on September 13, 2012, that rebukes Iran for the
continued development of its nuclear program.33 4
The jump in enriched uranium production, coupled with Iran's
328 Id. at 3.
329 See Joby Warrick, U.N. Sees Spike in Iran's Uranium Production, WASH. POST,
Feb. 25, 2012, at A10.
330 See id. The number of weapons that Iran could produce with its present quantity
of enriched uranium was separately estimated to be as many as five. See Lowrey &
Sanger, supra note 321.
331 See February IAEA Report, supra note 6, at 11.
332 David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, Inspectors Confirm New Work by Iran at
Secure Nuclear Site, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/08/31 /world/middleeast/nuclear-inspectors-confirm-iranian-progress.html.
333 Id.
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lack of transparency, quite rightly exacerbates international
concern about "Iran's march toward nuclear-weapons
capability."3 35
2. Intention: Iran-Israel Tensions
For almost twenty years, Israel has asserted that Iran poses an
"existential threat" to Israel."' In 2005, President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, at a conference entitled "The World without
Zionism," made the following statement:
Our dear Imam [Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini] said that the
occupying regime must be wiped off the map and this was a
very wise statement. We cannot compromise over the issue of
Palestine. Is it possible to create a new front in the heart of an
old front. This would be a defeat and whoever accepts the
legitimacy of [Israel] has in fact, signed the defeat of the Islamic
world.337
It should be noted, however, that shortly after this speech was
posted, it was removed from its original website and Iran's foreign
ministry "insisted [Iran] had no intention of attacking Israel." 3
Yet the President himself insisted that his remarks were "just."3 39
Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran's supreme religious leader, referred to
Israel as a "cancerous tumor."340 One scholar noted in 1996 that
"Israel faces serious and unprecedented danger from Iran"
stemming from "that revolutionary Islamic regime's. . .
unalterable commitment to destruction of the Jewish State."3 4'
In Israel, top officials are openly considering conducting a
335 See Warrick, supra note 329.
336 Trita Parsi, Iran, Israel, and the Real Existential Threat, FRONTLINE, Aug. 17,
2010, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/08/how-israel-
helped-the-islamic-republic-consolidate-power.html.
337 See SOFAER, THE BEST DEFENSE, supra note 202, at 166-67 (quoting Text of
Mahmoud Ahmadinejahad's Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/30/weekinreview/30iran.htmlpagewanted=I&ei=507
0&en=26f07fc5b7543417&ex=1 161230400).
338 Iran 'Not Planning Israel Attack,' BBC NEWS, Oct. 29, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/4387852.stm.
339 Id
340 Leily Lankarani, Iranian Leader: Israel A "Cancerous Tumor," CBS NEWS
(Mar. 4,2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-4842425-503543.html.
341 Beres, supra note 5, at 66.
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preemptive strike on Iran's nuclear program. 34 2  In early
November, Israel simulated a "mass-casualty attack," which
prompted speculations that Israel was simulating an attack on
Iran.343 In the past, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
has asserted that if the United States does not prevent Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons, "Israel may be forced to attack Iran's
nuclear facilities itself."34 4  More recently, Prime Minister
Netanyahu and Ehud Barak, Israel's defense minister, have
publicly supported an Israeli preemptive strike against Iran's
nuclear program.345 Barak has outlined three questions that Israel
would have to answer in the affirmative to order to preemptively
strike Iran:
1. Does Israel have the ability to cause severe damage to Iran's
nuclear sites and bring about a major delay in the Iranian nuclear
project? And can the military and the Israeli people withstand
the inevitable counterattack?
2. Does Israel have overt or tacit support, particularly from
America, for carrying out an attack?
3. Have all other possibilities for the containment of Iran's
nuclear threat been exhausted, bringing Israel to the point of last
resort? If so, is this the last opportunity for an attack?346
342 Isabel Kershner & David E. Snager, Israel Faces Questions About News Reports
of Eying Iran Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2011, at Al0. Specifically, the speculated
preemptive strike would target the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, supposedly the
"centerpiece of Iran's known nuclear-fuel production." Id.
343 Adrian Blomfield, Israel Simulates Mass-Casualty Missile Attack, THE
TELEGRAPH, Nov. 3, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
middleeast/israel/8867696/Israel-simulates-mass-casualty-missile-attack.html.
344 Jeffrey Goldberg, Netanyahu to Obama: Stop Iran-Or I Will, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 2009, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/
2009/03/netanyahu-to-obama-stop-iran-or-i-will/7390/.
345 Benjamin Netanyahu Seeks Cabinet Support for Israeli Strike on Iran, THE
TELEGRAPH, Nov. 2, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
middleeast/israel/8864696/Benjamin-Netanyahu-seeks-cabinet-support-for-Israeli-strike-
on-Iran.html; see also Bergman, supra note 7.
346 Bergman, supra note 7. Interestingly, two days after the publication of the news
article that reported these questions, a "high-ranking Israeli official" called the article's
author to clarify that "on the question of international legitimacy, Israel is 'not looking
for the international community's support or consent' or even tacit approval, 'but rather a
sympathetic view of Israel's difficult situation."' The Staff, The Aftermath of "Israel v.
Iran," N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2012, http://6thfloor.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/0l/the-
aftermath-of-israel-v-iran/?scpd4&sq=israel%20iran&st-cse.
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While Israeli leaders assert that there is no deadline to make
the final decision of whether to strike and assure the public that
such a decision is not imminent, Barak warned in January 2012
that "no more than one year remains to stop Iran from obtaining
nuclear weaponry."3 47 If Israel is to conduct a preemptive strike to
take out Iran's nuclear program, they must do so before "Iran's
accumulated know-how, raw materials, experience and
equipment ... will be such that an attack could not derail the
nuclear project."3 48  This point in the Iranian nuclear program,
when the program enters its "immunity zone," may be reached as
early as the fall of 2012.349
In response to these threats of preemptive strike, Iran has in
turn made threats of its own.350 The day after the IAEA released
its February report, which indicated extensive developments in
Iran's nuclear program,35 1 Iran stated that any Israeli attacks on
Iranian nuclear installations "will undoubtedly lead to the collapse
of the [Zionist] regime."35 2 Iran has threatened retaliation through
its long-range missile program. In November, Iran also asserted
it would attack NATO bases in Turkey if either Israel or the
United States launched an attack against Iran.3 54
Overall, it appears that Iran does not presently have the
capability to employ nuclear weapons, but the prospect of
attaining this capability is growing increasingly-and
worryingly-likely. Iran's intention to use these weapons against
Israel is not definite or transparent, but it is still a possibility.3 55
Strikingly, the clearest Iranian threats against Israel are seen
primarily in the context of warning Israel of the possibility of
347 Bergman, supra note 7.
348 Id
349 See Elizabeth Bumiller & Jodi Rudoren, U.S. and Israel Intensify Talks on Iran
Options, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2012, at Al.
350 Iran Threatens NATO Bases in Turkey, CBS NEWS, Nov. 26, 2011,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/I1/26/iran-threatens-turkey-nato-bases.html.
351 See supra notes 327-335 and accompanying text.
352 Iran Warns Israeli Attack on Nuclear Installations Will Lead to Israel's
Collapse, USA TODAY, Feb. 25, 2012, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-
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retaliation against an Israeli preemptive strike.356 It is in this
convoluted history of threat-and-reaction that it is necessary to
anticipate whether an Israeli preemptive strike on Iran's nuclear
program would be legal or legitimate under modem international
law.
C. Analysis
Under a restrictive interpretation of the U.N. Charter, Israel
would not be justified in attacking Iran's nuclear program because
Iran has not yet conducted an "armed attack."357  Yet most
authorities agree that Israel would be justified in a preemptive
strike against Iran if the imminence of an Iranian attack were
"clear."" An analysis under customary international law's
Caroline doctrine provides the foundation to determine whether
the possibility of an Iranian nuclear attack on Israel is sufficiently
imminent to justify an Israeli preemptive strike. However, as
discussed in Part II.A, the present analytical framework under
customary international law is vague and difficult to apply.359 To
supplement the traditional Caroline analysis, this comment will
also apply the analytical framework proposed by David Sadoff,
which offers clear factors to guide an analysis of whether an
Israeli preemptive strike would be acceptable under modem
international law.360
1. Customary International Law
The Caroline doctrine, which underlies the customary
international law analysis of anticipatory self-defense, has three
prongs: necessity, proportionality, and imminence. 3 61 Assessing
the necessity and proportionality prongs of the Caroline doctrine
is straightforward for the purposes of this comment. Necessity
requires that an action be "necessary to defend . . . against an
impending attack" and occur only after peaceful measures have
356 See id.
357 U.N. Charter art. 51; see also supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
358 See supra text accompanying note 155.
359 See supra notes 173-174 and accompanying text.
360 See Sadoff, Striking, supra note 10.
361 See supra Part II.A.
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been exhausted.3 62 Successfully defending against a nuclear attack
requires, by its very nature, a preemptive strike because an attack
would decimate a nation instantly.3 63  In addition, it might be
argued that peaceful measures have been exhausted if Iran
continues its present course of action: non-cooperation with U.N.
inspectors and apparent development of nuclear weapons, in
contravention of the Non-Proliferation Treaty3 64 and in spite of the
international pressure of multilateral economic sanctions. Thus,
for the purposes of this comment, a preemptive strike to deter the
threat of nuclear attack would meet the "necessity" requirement of
the Caroline doctrine.
Proportionality requires that action should not exceed what is
minimally necessary to respond to a threat.3 65 It would be in
Israel's diplomatic interests to respond with only the minimum
required to avert the threat of nuclear attack. A preemptive strike
that neutralizes Iran's nuclear program and does not exceed the
immediate threat to Israel to pursue "broader offensive or strategic
goals" would satisfy the requirement of proportionality.3 66
With the assumption that an Israeli preemptive strike would
meet both the necessity and proportionality prongs of a customary
international law analysis, this comment focuses on whether the
threat posed by Iran is sufficiently imminent to allow an Israeli
preemptive strike. As imminence is implicitly fact-based, this
comment will compare the present situation to the two incidents
that provide the most guidance on whether an act of anticipatory
self-defense is justified: the 1967 Six Day War, in which Israel
was considered justified in its defensive actions,3 67 and the 1981
Israeli attack on Osirak, which was uniformly condemned.3 68
As discussed in Part III.B, several threats were present in the
362 See supra notes 140-145 and accompanying text.
363 See Schachter, supra note 106, at 1634 ("[N]uclear missiles [may], on the first
strike, destroy the capability for defense and allow virtually no time for defense .... .").
364 See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. 2, July 1, 1968, 21
U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 ("Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty
undertakes not to ... manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices .... ).
365 See supra notes 149-154 and accompanying text.
366 See Garwood-Gowers, supra note 144, at 281.
367 Id. at 273.
368 Id. at 274.
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period leading up to the Six Day War that support the conclusion
that the threat of an Egyptian armed attack on Israel was
"imminent:" (1) Egypt's troops were mobilized at Israel's border,
(2) Egypt was forming military ties with Israel's enemies, (3)
Egypt ordered the removal of the U.N. troops who were present
for conflict-diffusing purposes, (4) Egypt invoked a blockade on
Israel's trade, and (5) the leader of Egypt proclaimed a goal of
"destroying" Israel. As Israel's strike on Egypt's troops was
generally considered to be legitimate by the international
community, it is these factors, taken together, that seem to meet
the "imminence" requirement of customary international law.
Israel, taken in the light most favorable to an argument for
legitimacy, may face two of these Six Day War factors in the
present situation with Iran. First, it is widely reported that Iranian
leaders believe that Israel should be "wiped off the map."3 69 This
is somewhat similar to the threats by Egypt's leader that preceded
the Six Day War.370 However, other than a few well-publicized
statements from public leaders, there does not appear to be any
further corroborations of an intention to attack Israel.
Developing nuclear weapons, because of their first-strike
capabilities, may be tantamount to a mobilization of troops. With
nuclear capability, Iran would be able to attack Israel as swiftly as
if it had a legion of troops on Israel's border. However, the
mobilization of troops in the Six Day War was a threat that was
unique to Israel, due to the geographical nature of the region.3 72
Comparatively, there is no strong tie between Iran's nuclear
program and Israel that would indicate that such a "mobilization,"
if it were to be considered such, would be specifically targeting
Israel. The only tie that could conceivably serve as such a link is
Iran's professed hatred of the Jewish state.373 However, the
remaining three factors from the Six Day War - developing
369 See SOFAER, THE BEST DEFENSE, supra note 202.
370 See generally Raymond & Kegley, supra note 12, at 102 (explaining Egypt's
goal in a war with Israel would be destruction of the "Jewish state").
371 See supra notes 336-341 and accompanying text.
372 Egypt was growing military ties with Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. Egypt borders
Israel to the southwest, Jordan borders Israel to the east, and Syria borders Israel to the
northeast. The geography of these forces is significant in that a military coalition was
being formed to surround the Israeli state.
373 See supra note 341 and accompanying text.
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regional military ties, a blockade, and the removal of U.N. troops
- are not present. The absence of these factors indicates that the
threat currently posed by Iran only moderately resembles the
threat posed by Egypt preceding the Six Day War.
The present situation between Israel and Iran more closely
resembles Israel's attack on the Osirak reactor in 1981, which was
widely regarded as an unacceptable use of force under customary
international law.374 Several factors that were considered to be
insufficient to justify an act of anticipatory self-defense are present
here: the development of nuclear weapons and the attendant risk of
a nuclear first strike; IAEA reports indicating that Iran's nuclear
program are quite possibly directed towards the development of
nuclear weapons; and a high production of enriched uranium that
could be intended for use in nuclear weapons.3 75 However, the
IAEA reports and the vast quantities of enriched uranium indicate
that there may an even stronger argument for an "imminent attack"
by Iran today.
The presence of these factors, without more, does not rise to
the "imminence" seen in the Six Day War. First, two factors
articulated by Professor Greenwood are not definitively present:376
possession of weapons and an intention to use these weapons. The
IAEA has not reported that Iran actually has, or will soon have,
nuclear weapons; it merely suggests that there may be military
dimensions to the nuclear program.7 Second, though it seems
clear that Iranian leaders would prefer that Israel not exist, this
does not necessarily equate to an "intention" to use nuclear
weapons-should they come into Iran's possession-against the
Israeli state.
While Israel may have a stronger argument for imminence
today than it did in 1981, the present situation bears much stronger
resemblance to the 1981 Osirak incident, where imminence was
clearly not found, than to the 1967 Six Day War. As the Iranian
threat against Israel does not rise to the imminence required by the
Caroline doctrine, an Israeli preemptive strike against Iran would
not be legal under customary international law.
374 See Garwood-Gowers, supra note 144, at 264.
375 See id.
376 See supra text accompanying note 173.
377 See February IAEA Report, supra note 6, at 8.
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2. Sadoff's Framework
The analytical framework proposed by David Sadoff offers an
analysis of anticipatory self-defense that is significanitly less
vague than analysis available under customary international law.
The first component of Sadoff's framework, properly gauging the
threat, is precisely the task undertaken by this comment. Sadoff's
framework breaks down this component in a way that reflects and
clarifies the "imminence" analysis of the Caroline doctrine. This
framework analyzes the factors of (a) the nature and scale, (b) the
likelihood, and (c) the timing of the threat to determine whether a
threat would be sufficiently imminent to justify an act of
anticipatory self-defense.37 8
First, assessing the nature and scale of an Iranian nuclear
attack is fairly straightforward. Israel fears facing the threat of
"first strike" nuclear attack, which would leave little or no time for
Israel to respond defensively once launched.37 9 Israel would likely
receive little to no warning of a nuclear launch. Such an attack
could decimate the entirety of the Israeli state. The nature and
scale of the threat is likely the gravest threat imaginable.
The "likelihood" of the attack, however, is much more
ambiguous. First, the statements by Iranian leaders that
demonstrate a desire to see Israel "wiped off the map," 8 o though
troubling, do not seem to effectively constitute a "public
expression" of a "will to attack.""' The intent of the attacker here
is couched in public rhetoric. Though there are strong ideological
tensions embodied in Israeli-Arab conflict that engulf the entirety
of the Middle East.382 There is little doubt that Iranian leaders
would be happy to have a world without the Israeli state, this does
not indicate a clear intention to launch an attack. Second, Iran
does not presently have the capacity to mount the attack.383
Though Iran is possibly on the path to achieving this capacity,38 4 it
378 See Sadoff, Striking, supra note 10, at 470.
379 See Schachter, supra note 106.
380 See SOFAER, THE BEST DEFENSE supra note 202.
381 See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
382 See FRED HALLIDAY, THE MIDDLE EAST IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: POWER,
POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY 193-228 (2005).
383 See February IAEA Report, supra note 6, 50.
384 See id.
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is not synonymous with being on the path to actually using nuclear
weapons against Israel. There does not seem to be any certainty
that a nuclear attack on Israel will occur. Thus, the present
situation is not a matter of when, but of if.3 "8 Third, Sadoff's
framework considers the international community's reaction to a
nuclear attack on Israel."' Such a reaction would be extremely
condemnatory, and would likely deter such an attack. Though Iran
expresses strong anti-Israel sentiments, it has not outwardly
expressed any intention to attack and does not presently have the
capacity to attack.
The third factor in gauging the threat, timing, is interspersed
with the likelihood factor. Sadoff suggests similar questions for
the assessment of these two components.38 7 This seems
appropriate. If an attack is not very likely to occur, then it is moot
to consider whether the timing of an attack is sufficiently
immediate to justify a pre-emptive strike.
3. Considerations
Under the analyses of both the customary international law and
Sadoff's frameworks, an Israeli preemptive strike on Iran would
be neither legitimate nor legal. The legality afforded by the
Caroline doctrine is restricted to situations where the threat of
attack is imminent and the use of force employed to defend is
necessary and proportionate to the threat posed.388 Though a threat
of nuclear attack would be very serious, such a threat from Iran is
not presently imminent. Yet if a nuclear threat were to become
"imminent" under the Caroline doctrine or "likely" under the
Sadoff framework, using preemptive force to deter an attack
would be justified.
Also significant to the Caroline doctrine's approach is that
there are more options available to Israel than just using force.
First, Israel has the option of appealing to the U.N. Security
385 See supra notes 191-192 and accompanying text (explaining defensive actions
are appropriate when the question of attack is not "if' an attack will occur, but "when").
386 See Sadoff, Striking, supra note 10, at 478.
387 Both sets of questions suggested by Sadoff inquire to the presumed attacker's
"publicly express" will or intent, military deployments by the presumed attacker, status
of negotiations between the states at issue, and the military capabilities of the presumed
attacker. See supra notes 191 and 197.
388 See Rogoff & Collins, supra note 49, at 498.
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Council, which may authorize the preemptive use of force through
its Chapter VII authority.389 Second, the use of diplomatic
pressure and international sanctions by Israel's allies3 90 has not
been exhausted, and may yet prove successful in subduing Iran as
a nuclear threat. The evidence that the economic sanctions are
having an effect on Iran, though sparking worry in some due to
concerns the leaders may be acting more erratically,3 9 ' is actually
a strong indicator that alternatives to using force are working.
VI. Conclusion
There are several problems in the traditional customary
international law framework of analyzing necessity,
proportionality, and imminence to evaluate uses of force in
anticipatory self-defense. First, the rules that govern use of force
must be generally known.39 2 The expansivist-restrictionist
doctrinal debate concerning the strict legality of anticipatory self-
defense under Article 51 creates ambiguity in understandings of
the law. This ambiguity undermines the ability of the international
community to reach consensus in condemning or endorsing uses
of force in anticipation of an armed attack. Yet the solution
cannot be found in choosing one side over the other. On one hand,
adopting the restrictivist approach to Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter and precluding the legality of using force in any instance
not first preceded by an "armed attack" would leave nations
vulnerable to first strikes that threaten state survival.39 3 On the
other hand, adopting the expansivist approach can leave too much
room for using force in self-defense where there is no actual
imminence of a threatened attack.394
389 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
390 The United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada have all enacted new
measures to put pressure on Iran in response to the November 8 IAEA report. Landler,
supra note 321. South Korea has also moved to apply sanctions against Iran in response
to Iran's nuclear program. Eunkyung Seo & Sungwoo Park, S. Korea Expands Sanctions
Against Iran Over Nuclear Program, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 16, 2011,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-16/south-korea-expands-economic-sanctions-
against-iran-over-nuclear-program.html.
391 See supra notes 321-326 and accompanying text.
392 See High-level Panel Report, supra note 9, at 2.
393 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
394 See supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
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Second, the rules that govern use of force must be generally
accepted. The current legal framework is unsuited to the realities
of modem warfare, where weapons of mass destruction carry first-
strike capabilities that leave no opportunity for self-defense.
Modem international law must have the flexibility to recognize the
right of a state to use preemptive force when it is the only defense
available against an attack threatening the state's very existence.
Without this flexibility, the legal order loses legitimacy. Without
general acceptance of the laws that should bind, these laws lose
their normative and prescriptive value.3 95
Expansive overhaul of the modem international legal order is
not the solution. Customary international law is established by the
general practices of states, which in turn generates a collective
sense of legal obligation.39 6 If changes to modern international
law occur too quickly and in too high a degree, it will be even
more difficult for laws to be generally known. Another risk is that
any large overhaul may favor the large, powerful states at the
expense of states with less influence.39 7 The solution should be
incremental changes to the existing legal framework. This would
allow the law to retain its normative value that would favor all
states as equal entities under the law. Incremental changes would
also allow the law to develop at a pace with which international
consensus can keep up.
Incorporating legitimacy into modern international law is a
priority. Legitimacy ensures the general acceptance necessary to
sustain a legal order. The criteria suggested by the U.N. High-
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change is a good starting
point.398 The Panel encourages the U.N. Security Council to
address these criteria when deciding whether to authorize or
endorse the use of military force in anticipatory self-defense.399
However, the U.N. should affirmatively endorse consideration of
these criteria to member-states and to intergovernmental
395 See Svarc, supra note 67, at 190.
396 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: SOURCES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 102 (1987).
397 This is one criticism of "the Bush doctrine," which favors states who have the
military capacity to effect preventive strikes against threatening actors, regardless of the
imminence of the threat. See varc, supra note 67, at 187-88.
398 See supra notes 212-221 and accompanying text.
399 See supra text accompanying note 212.
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organizations charged with moderating international use of
force.400 In addition, modern law should formally incorporate
consideration of the normative views of both state actors and non-
state actors, including the nongovernmental organizations and the
press.
Furthermore, the international community needs predictability
and transparency in modern international law to assure legitimacy.
A clear, practicable framework for the evaluation of uses of force
must be adopted. The framework proposed by David Sadoff
would be a good candidate. His proposal incorporates the
traditional Caroline model of analysis while also including a mode
of assessment of modem day considerations, such as nuclear
threats. 401 The framework lists numerous factors to consider when
gauging the severity of a threat. Factors such as these will help
create a clear method to evaluate use of force, which will result in
predictability and transparency in future evaluations.
Under both traditional and alternative analyses, Israel would
not be presently justified to preemptively strike Iran's nuclear
program. Under the customary international law analysis, Israel
would not be justified because the threat is not yet imminent: Iran
has not demonstrated a clear intent to attack Israel and does not yet
have the capability to carry out a nuclear attack. Under Sadoff's
proposed framework, Israel would not be justified for many of the
same reasons: there is not a sufficient likelihood that an attack
would occur.
There is room, however, for Israel to justify a preemptive
strike under the "preventive" self-defense approach, in which a
preemptive strike may occur though the threat is more temporally
removed.40 2 This demonstrates the danger inherent in adopting
such an approach, which discounts the importance of anticipatory
force being used only as a "last resort." An approach that strays
too far from existing modern law norms runs the risk of endorsing
actions that would be widely viewed as illegitimate.4 0 3
400 The International Committee of the Red Cross is one such organization, whose
goals include "promot[ing] respect for international humanitarian law." See The
Mandate and Mission of the ICRC, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
http://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/mandate/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 16, 2012).
401 See Sadoff, Striking, supra note 10, at 457.
402 See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
403 One example of an action endorsed under the preventive war doctrine, but
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An additional consideration is that under a legitimacy
argument, the danger that a nuclear Iran poses to global peace and
security may be enough to justify a preemptive strike in order to
ensure global security. Many nations have indeed spoken out
against Iran's development of nuclear weapons. By several
accounts, a nuclear-capable Iran would be a serious threat to the
entire Middle East region and the world.404 For example, Algerian
ministers claim that once Iran achieves nuclear capability, they
will share the technology with "its fellow Muslim nations.
However, this danger should not be addressed by. the unilateral
assessment of a paternalistic nation, such as the United States. If
the threat Iran poses to global security warrants a preemptive
strike, then multilateral action by the U.N. Security Council should
be taken.40 6
In conclusion, though it is tempting to simply "rewrite the
rules" to adapt the traditional international laws to address modern
day threats, doing so would disrupt the international legal order.
Deficiencies in the modern legal framework should be addressed
incrementally, with a priority given to incorporating legitimacy
and creating clear, practicable standards to evaluate use of force in
anticipatory self-defense. Such a framework would clarify the
widely criticized is the 2003 U.S. involvement in Iraq.
404 For a detailed analysis of the "major civilian effects" of a nuclear conflict
between Iran and Israel, see ANTHONY CORDESMAN & ABDULLAH TOUKAN, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, IRAN, ISRAEL AND THE EFFECTS OF A NUCLEAR
CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST (June 1, 2009), available at
http://csis.org/publication/iran-israel-and-effects-nuclear-conflict-middle-east.
405 Using Nuclear Technology Is Iran's Legitimate Right, Algerian Min, ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 29, 2011, http://www.irna.ir/
ENNewsShow.aspx?NID=30636965. Significantly, this news article has been removed
from the Islamic Republic News Agency's website as of the time of
publication. See Using Nuclear Technology is Iran's Legitimate Right, Algerian Min,
WORLD NEWS NETWORK, Nov. 29, 2011, http://article.wn.com/view/
2011/10/29/Usingnuclear technologyisIran_s_legitimate right Algerian/ (while
including the introduction to the article, clicking the website's "more >>" link leads
instead to a "Page Not Found" site hosted by the IRNA webpage,
"http://www.irna.ir/falpagenotfound.htmaspxerrorpath=/ENNewsShow.aspx") (last
visited October 14, 2012).
406 There are a number of criticisms concerning the effectiveness of the Security
Council. See Sadoff, Striking, supra note 10, at 460. However, the necessity of
multilateral action, rather than unilateral, is paramount to preserving the integrity of
international legal order.
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present illegitimacy and illegality of an Israeli strike on Iran's
nuclear program. Wide recognition of the illegitimacy of a strike
would lead to international condemnation, thus foiling the trigger
that would lead the world into World War III.

